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NOWHERE TO RUN, NOWHERE TO
HIDE: AuGUSTO PINOCHET,
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, THE ICC,
AND A WAKE-UP CALL FOR FORMER
HEADS OF STATE
"We have lived in a golden age of impunity, where a person
stands a much better chance of being tried for taking a single
life than for killing ten thousand or a million."1
INTRODUCTION
Santiago, Chile, 1973. A bedraggled family of four is herded
along with hundreds of others into the bleachers of the Chilean Na-
tional Stadium at gunpoint. Huddled together, the family's false
sense of security evaporates as hair-raising screams and blood-
curdling yells pierce the night. These sounds do not emanate from the
bleachers-the soccer balls having long since been abandoned-
rather, they echo through the lower levels of the stadium, near the bath-
rooms and ticket booths.2 Suddenly, each family member is jerked
upright and prodded along the descending ramps toward an unimag-
inable hell. As they reach the lower level, the parents are quickly
bound and thrust beneath a metal table known as the "grill."3 Their
children are laid naked on the table while their extremities are tied to
each end. Electric shocks are administered, and the parents are forced
to gaze upward helplessly as their children writhe in agony.4 A short
burst of gunfire rings out as another detainee fails to cooperate with
the guards. Having survived this round of torture, the parents carry
their little ones out of lower levels, out of the smell of burning flesh,
1 Is a U.N. International Criminal Court in the U.S. National Interest?: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Int'l Operations of the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. 72, 72
(1998) [hereinafter Scharf Testimony] (testimony of Michael P. Scharf, Professor, New England
School of Law) (arguing in favor of an international criminal court).
2 See Pamela Constable, Pinochet's Arrest Rouses Bitter Tensions Among D.C. Area
Chileans, WASH. PosT, Dec. 23, 1998, at Al1.
3 T.R. Reid, Pinochet's Lmwyers Ask Court to Reconsider Immunity Ruling, WASH. POST,
Dec. 11, 1998, at A50.
4 See id.
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out of the rooms lined with bodies, and out of the blood-stained hall-
ways, thankful that for now, they will not be added to the growing
lists of the disappeared.
The above account is an all too familiar narrative for many
Chileans and other countries' nationals swept up in Chile's 1973 coup
d'6tat. While fictional as a whole, it is a compilation of numerous
true stories, and is representative of the varying atrocities that were
committed with the approval of the insurgent Augusto Pinochet
against left-leaning and Marxist supporters of Salvador Allende's
overthrown government.5 Although a haunting reminder for those
survivors and relatives of the unfortunate, this account of large-scale
repression, torture, persecution, disappearances, and murder at the
hands of a despotic head of state represents to the world a frequent
violation of international human rights law and the repeated commis-
sion of punishable crimes against humanity. In Death by Govern-
ment, Professor Rudi Rummel documents such abuses throughout the
past century and delivers a staggering estimate that nearly 170 million
civilians have been subjected to genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity during this period.6 Yet, in nearly every case, the
dictator, head of state, president, or military ruler responsible for the
infliction of these atrocities has escaped censure, punishment, or jus-
tice.
These despots' concerns about being held accountable for their
actions are typified by Adolf Hitler's response when queried about
possible punishment for his acts of genocide and war crimes: "'Who
after all is today speaking about the destruction of the Armenians."' 7
Yet, although the world community expressed outrage over the geno-
cidal extermination of nearly six million Jews and pledged that such
crimes would "'never again"' occur, this pledge soon became "'again
and again"' following the Great War.8 Within the last fifty years,
30,000 have disappeared in Argentina's Dirty War, two million were
slaughtered in Cambodia, 750,000 were massacred in Uganda,
200,000 were killed in East Timor, 100,000 Kurds were gassed in
Iraq, and 75,000 civilians were butchered in El Salvador.9 Despite
these appalling numbers, many of the now former despots responsible
5 For additional accounts, see Full Charges Against Pinochet Laid Out for First Time,
AG NCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 19, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, Agence France
Presse File; Joyce Wadler, Years After Torture, a Cry Against Pinochet, N.Y. TIlmEs, Feb. 3,
1999, at B2.
6 See Scharf Testimony, supra note 1, at 72.
7 Id. Hitler was referring to the amnesty granted to Turkish leaders following World War
I for the systematic murder of one million Armenians.
8Id.
9 See id.
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for the crimes currently live comfortably around the world, free from
their countries' own laws, and free from justice. For instance, Haiti's
"Baby Doc" Duvalier currently bounces between homes of France's
Haitian community in the Riviera; Paraguay's Alfredo Stroessner
keeps a mansion outside of Brasilia, Brazil; and Uganda's Idi Amin
can be seen venturing to markets in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.10 Other
despots, however, have retained their power and continue to commit
crimes against humanity: Slobodan Milosevic, known for leading
Serbian forces in the massacre of tens of thousands of Muslims, re-
cently committed further human rights abuses in Kosovo, and Sad-
dam Hussein continues to rule Iraq with an iron fist. Whether it is a
result of these leaders' self-proclaimed amnesties, proclamations of
their continuing immunities as current or former heads of state, or a
general apathy and unwillingness to spend the time and effort in pur-
suing these despots around the globe, the world community's failure
to bring such former despots to justice has indirectly encouraged the
likes of Radovan Karadzic and Radko Mladic to continue their egre-
gious actions. Thus, as the new millennium this next generation of
Pol Pots, Kim Jong Is, and Mengistu Haile Mariams continue to
commit unbridled acts of crimes against humanity.
12
Notwithstanding the world's failure to bring such leaders to jus-
tice and the continuing commission of large scale crimes against hu-
manity in the last fifty years, an indication that international human
rights law is heading in the right direction is the increasing acceptance
of the universality principle as a means of transcending national bor-
ders and gaining jurisdiction over those responsible for administering
or supervising crimes against humanity. Although this principle first
emerged in the 1945 Nuremberg Charter, the veil of states' sover-
eignty, political considerations, a "passively enforced extradition pro-
cess," and the Cold War all contributed to the world community's
reluctance to concertedly condemn these atrocities and resulted in
"sporadic attempts to develop and adjudicate international criminal
law" as each crisis presented itself.13 Following the Cold War, how-
ever, the frequency with which "regional and ethnic wars" appeared
mandated some semblance of justice, and "nations freed from binary
superpower conflict have been impelled to organize themselves in
'a See Daniela Deane, Former Dictators May Find Exile Not Quite As Safe, USA TODAY,
Oct. 28, 1998, at 14A.
" Seeid.12 See Scharf Testimony, supra note 1, at 72.
13 Bradley E. Berg, The 1994 LLC. Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court: A
Principled Appraisal of Jurisdictional Structure, 28 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 221, 230 (1996).
For a discussion of the universality principle in full, see infra Part I.
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new ways to act in concert."'14 Yet, despite the globalization of the
world, in which nations currently assist each other in "such matters as
drug trafficking, money laundering and tax evasion," individual
countries have rarely acted on their words or legislation calling for the
punishment of grave crimes against humanity, and the architects of
these crimes continue to roam the globe today.15
The reasons for countries' inaction, apathy, or acquiescence in
allowing despots a safe haven vary. Some, like Brazil, choose to
leave the "ghosts of authoritarianism" undisturbed. 16 Others, like Ar-
gentina, take a middle ground by exposing the atrocities of its leaders,
but pardoning a great majority of them.17 Still others question "going
to the trouble of hauling doddering old war criminals and architects of
genocide before prosecutors." 18 Many of these countries feel that the
attempted prosecution of a Saddam Hussein-type ruler would be
viewed "as a mockery of civilized international relations" since no
verdict could ever purport to bestow justice for the most egregious of
crimes. 19 The end result is either that extra-judicial means of punish-
ment, such as assassination, occur or the crimes are left unpunished.
Finally, a number of countries trade amnesty for the despot's resigna-
tion and abdication of his position, a remedy that allows a peaceable
transfer of power.2°
On October 16, 1998, however, Spain shocked the international
community by requesting the arrest and eventual extradition of the
former Chilean head of state, Augusto Pinochet, from Britain, where
he was recovering from back surgery. Based initially on claims that
Pinochet's regime had murdered Spanish citizens in Chile during his
brutal seventeen-year rule, the arrest warrant and extradition claim
quickly shifted to center on the universality of the crimes of torture,
terrorism, and murder.2' In making this claim, Spain exhibited a
precedential willingness to bring a notorious human rights violator to
justice "regardless of national jurisdictions or the passage of time., 22
14 Charles Trueheart, Pinochet Case Signifies Cries for Retribution: Arrest Could Make It
Easier to Bring Other Tyrants to Justice, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1998, at A21.
15 Id.
16 Anthony Faiola, Pinochet Case Opens Closet of a Continent, WASH. POST, Oct. 23,
1998, at A20.
17 See id.
18 Trueheart, supra note 14, at A21.
19 Louis Rend Beres, Why and How Saddam Mast Be Punished: A Jurispruden-
tial/Philosophic Explanation, 75 U. DEr. MERCY L. REv. 667, 676 (1998) (arguing that the
United States' responsibility to ensure punishment of Saddam Hussein derives from both inter-
national and natural law principles).
20 See Faiola, supra note 16, at A20.
21 See Alan Cowell, Spain Widens Charges for Pinochet; He Signals He'll Fight Extradi-
tion, N.Y. ThoES, Oct. 20, 1998, at A14.
22 Trueheart, supra note 14, at A21.
[Vol. 50:127
A WAKE-UP CALL FOR FORMER HEADS OF STATE
The principle of universality, first promulgated at Nuremberg,
reached its high water mark as Pinochet was wheeled into the Bel-
marsh magistrates court, Britain's "designated venue for terrorists and
high-security criminals" following a House of Lords decision denying
him immunity and ruling that the extradition process could proceed.23
Despite this achievement, many issues remain unresolved.
This Note seeks to use the matter pending against Augusto Pino-
chet as a case study to determine whether there is an emerging obli-
gation in international law to investigate and impart justice on those
former heads of state guilty of committing war crimes, genocide, and
crimes against humanity in light of the growing acceptance of univer-
sal jurisdiction. Part I examines Pinochet's rule, chronicling the hu-
man rights abuses and amnesty his regime was granted prior to the
transfer of power in 1990. Part II details the rise of universal juris-
diction through various international conventions and resolutions as
well as individual countries' implementation of such legislation. Part
III assesses Britain's House of Lords' ruling that Pinochet, as a for-
mer head of state, enjoyed no immunity from arrest for several of his
crimes and for subsequent extradition from Britain. Special attention
will be paid to the relevant British laws and recent case law suggest-
ing that crimes against humanity can no longer be considered normal
functions of a head of state. Part IV discusses the impact of and as-
sesses the role that the recently created International Criminal Court
will have on future prosecutions of despots, as well as what effect it
might have had on the Pinochet case. Finally, this Note concludes
that there is an emerging norm to investigate and impart justice on
those authoritarians who commit such acts as genocide and crimes
against humanity, but that this norm can only be maintained by a con-
sistent policy reflecting the world's desire to punish the wrongdoers,
bring justice to the victims and their families, deter future violators,
and spread a pedagogical message concerning the rules of moral con-
duct.
I. PINOCHET'S LICENSE To KILL
On September 11, 1973, Augusto Pinochet and the Chilean
military wrested power from the socialist government of Salvador
Allende in a bloody coup, the ramifications of which would be felt
during the next seventeen years of his brutal tenure.24 The first five
2- David Graves & Neil Tweedie, The Day the General Went to Court, DAILY TELE-
GRAPH, Dec. 12, 1998, at 4.
24 See Derechos Human Rights Report, The Criminal Procedures Against
Chilean and Argentinean Repressors in Spain, (visited Nov. 7, 1998)
<http://www.derechos.net/margalpapers/spain.html> [hereinafter Derechos Report].
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years of his rule proved to be the harshest years of repression as Pino-
chet sought to strengthen his regime by weeding out all left-leaning or
socialist supporters of the deposed and soon-murdered Allende. 2
During this period, hundreds of Pinochet's political opponents were
arrested and tortured at the hands of the Chilean National Intelligence
Directorate (DINA), and between three and four thousand were exe-
cuted or simply disappeared.26 Many of the arrests and executions
were the result of the implementation of "Operation Condor," a series
of mutual aid agreements between the intelligence services of Argen-
tina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay designed to fa-
cilitate the "'elimination of communism."' 27 Funded in part by the
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, with whom Pinochet's top military
adviser, Manuel Contreras, kept close contact, the agreement allowed
intelligence agents of countries that were party to the agreement ac-
cess to other party countries to "eliminate opposition politicians, sub-
versives and suspected subversives." 28 Through this collaboration,
hundreds of Pinochet's political opponents who had fled the country
when he ascended to power were arrested and returned to Chile where
they either disappeared or were executed.29
As the number of human rights violations slowed to a trickle in
1978, Pinochet sought to secure immunity for both himself and the
military officials that had carried out the crimes against humanity at
his direction by issuing a general amnesty decree, called the Amnesty
Law of 1978.30 Taking effect on March 10, 1978, the decree immu-
nized his regime for any and all crimes it had committed between
September 11, 1973 and March 10, 1978.31 In 1990, Pinochet stepped
down as head of Chile, but in exchange for the peaceful abdication of
power and the chance to hold democratic elections, he requested and
received a new Constitution granting him a Senator-for-Life status
under which he is immune from prosecution.32 Following Chile's
return to civilian law in 1990, President Aylwin established the
Commission for Truth and Reconciliation in response to the hundreds
2 See id.
26 See id. (discussing the arrests and torture by the DINA); Alexander MacLeod, What's
Next for Chile's Pinochet, CHRISTIAN SCL MONITOR, Nov. 27, 1998, at 6 (noting that Judge
Garzon's request for Pinochet's extradition implicated him in 3,178 murders or disappearances).
27 Derechos Report, supra note 24.
2 Id.
29 See id.
3 See id.
31 See Amnesty Int'l Report, CHILE: Transition at the Crossroads; Human Rights Viola-
tions Under Pinochet Rule Remain the Crux (last modified March, 1996)
<http://www.amnesty.it/ailib/aipub/1996/AMRI22200196.html > [hereinafter Amnesty Int'l
Report].
32 See Derechos Report, supra note 24.
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of lawsuits filed against Pinochet by relatives of those who disap-
peared or who were tortured or executed during his rule.33 Despite
the publishing of the staggering figures of the nearly four thousand
deaths and executions that occurred, the majority dating to the initial
five years of Pinochet's tenure, the Chilean Supreme Court continued
the process it began in 1979 of closing lawsuits against the former
head of state due to the Amnesty Law.34
Amnesty International has led the charge to halt the arbitrary
closing of cases based on human rights violations that occurred dur-
ing the amnesty period, arguing that such amnesty laws run contrary
to international human rights standards.35 In particular, Amnesty In-
ternational points to article 13 of the United Nations Declaration on
the Protection of All Persons From Enforced Disappearance, which
mandates that "'[a]n investigation.., should be able to be conducted
for as long as the fate of the victim of enforced disappearance remains
unclarified.' ' '36 Despite these ongoing arguments, the Chilean Su-
preme Court began expediting its case closings in 1995.37
Amidst the closings, however, one glimmer of hope has emerged
for cases arising during the amnesty period. On May 23, 1995, the II
Chamber of the Chilean Supreme Court rejected the state's argument
for the application of the 1978 Amnesty Law in the case of Carmelo
Soria, a dual Chilean-Spanish national working for the U.N., whose
mutilated body was found in a roadside canal in 1976.38 In that case,
lawyers for Soria's family successfully argued that the Vienna Con-
vention on Crimes Committed Against International Civil Servants
and other Diplomatic Officials, which mandated that states punish
those persons guilty of crimes against such individuals, took prece-
dence over the Amnesty Law because it had been ratified by Chile in
1977 prior to the 1978 Amnesty Law.39 However, subsequent at-
tempts -in other cases to invoke similar conventions such as the Ge-
neva Convention of 1949 or the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights have been largely unsuccessful. 40
Finally, although cases involving crimes against humanity com-
mitted after 1978 are not barred by the law, these prosecutions have
made little or no progress as well.41 In fact, Amnesty International
33 See Amnesty Int'l Report, supra note 31.
4 See id.
3S See id.
36 id
37 See id.
38 See id.
39 See id
40 See id.
41 See id.
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has discovered that a few of the lawyers or judges who have enjoyed
mild success at the lower levels of the judiciary have been suddenly
"reallocated to other duties" by the government soon after victory.
42
At present, the Chilean Foreign Minister Jose Miguel Insulza has in-
dicated that only fourteen cases alleging human rights abuses against
Pinochet "are in the hands of prosecutors. '' 4
II. THE BIRTH AND MATURATION OF THE UNIVERSALITY
PRINCIPLE
Scholars and international law jurists alike claim that the princi-
ple of universality was born out of the Nuremberg Charter of 1945.
Its drafters, however, insisted they were not making law, but instead
were merely codifying a principle that had permeated history since
the days of piracy on the high seas when these bandits were consid-
ered "hostis humanis generis," or enemies of mankind.44 Universality
has since generally been accepted to encompass crimes so heinous in
nature that they constitute a mutual threat to all states; thus, the of-
fender may be prosecuted by any state under that state's national
laws.45 At Nuremberg, lead prosecutor Justice Robert H. Jackson was
guided by the belief that "'[crimes against international law are
committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing
individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of interna-
tional law be enforced.' 46 As such, the Nuremberg Charter was
drafted to allow the piercing of states' sovereignty in order to hold
individuals accountable, regardless of their position as heads of state
or government officials, for "crimes against peace (aggressive war),
crimes against the laws of war (war crimes), and crimes against hu-
manity (murder and injury to civilians for racial, religious, or political
42 Id.
43 Warren Hoge, Chilean Official Says His Country Will Pursue Justice Against Pinochet,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 30, 1998, at AI0.
44 Hari M. Osofsky, Note, Domesticating International Criminal Law: Bringing Human
Rights Violators to Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 191, 194 (1997) (detailing the evolution of the uni-
versality principle).
45 Universality is one of five recognized principles of attaining jurisdiction, the other four
being: territorial, nationality, passive personality, and protective. Under the territorial principle,
jurisdiction is determined with respect to the location of the crime, and a state is entitled to
punish crimes that occur in its own territory. Under the nationality principle, states prescribe
laws that bind their nationals regardless of the location of the crime or the national. Under the
protective principle, jurisdiction is exercised over those acts that occur outside a state's territory
but that threaten that state's security. Under the passive personality principle, jurisdiction is
granted to a state over crimes committed against its own nationals regardless of their location or
that of the crime. See Christopher C. Joyner &Wayne P. Rothbaum, Libya and the Aerial Inci-
dent at Lockerbie: What Lessons for International Extradition Law?, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 222,
235-36 nn.79-82 (1993) (citations omitted).
46 Berg, supra note 13, at 232 (citation omitted).
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reasons).' 47 As one Nuremberg prosecutor has noted, "[Nuremberg]
was a revolutionary break with the shackles of the past, and it grew
out of the conviction that there was a better way. 48
A. The Evolution
In the years immediately following Nuremberg, the Charter
served as a launching pad for several more attempts to codify interna-
tional humanitarian law while at the same time pierce states' sover-
eignty.49 Most notable were the European Convention on Human
Rights, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention of 1948), and the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).5 0 Through these conven-
tions, the international community mandated that it would no longer
turn a blind eye to the atrocities that were being committed world-
wide. Rather, it would hold anyone, including heads of state, interna-
tionally responsible for the crimes he committed in his own territory
against his own nationals. In particular, the Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide helped cement the
concept of universal jurisdiction, as it called for international con-
demnation of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggressive
war, but also added the crime of genocide to the list of universally
punishable atrocities.51 Article IV of that Convention clearly man-
dated that even "constitutionally responsible rulers" or public officials
were subject to punishment 52 The Convention also delineated two
possible places in which to try defendants: an international tribunal or
the country in which the human rights abuses took place.
53
Although the world community's involvement in the Cold War
slowed the pace with which the principle of universality was imple-
mented in the language of other international conventions, several
important steps were taken toward increasing the roles that national
courts would play in prosecuting human rights abuses. 4 In 1956, the
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institu-
47 Henry T. King, Jr., The Meaning of Nuremberg, Remarks at the McLean Lecture at the
University of Pittsburgh Law School, in 30 CASE W. Rns. J. INT'L L. 143, 144 (1998).
41 Id. at 148.
49 See id. at 144.
'o See id
S1 See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide
Convention), Dec. 9, 1948,78 U.N.T.S. 277,281-83.
2 Id at282.
5 See Osofsky, supra note 44, at 195.
m See id. at 196 (stating that the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery,
the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery and the International Conven-
tion on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid were important steps in
increasing the role that national courts would play in policing human rights abuses).
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tions and Practices Similar to Slavery55 mandated the "national crimi-
nalization of the slave trade... and international cooperation regard-
ing the commission and prosecution of the slave trade., 5 6 While no
article of the Convention explicitly mandates that violators may be
punished in an unrelated third nation, there is a strong presumption
that national courts are the appropriate forums for such prosecutions
as no mention is made of the need for international tribunals in such
matters.57 Following a similar convention in 1973, the International
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid,58 signatories were obligated to implement national legisla-
tion criminalizing apartheid.59 Articles IV and V of that convention
indicate that any state possessing in personam jurisdiction of the ac-
cused may subject him to its own national jurisdiction. 60 While the
phrase "universal jurisdiction" itself is not explicitly mentioned as the
basis for this jurisdiction, logic presumes it is the only one of the five
traditional principles of obtaining jurisdiction that would suffice in
such a situation.6'
The proliferation of worldwide terrorist activities during the
1960s and 1970s prompted the international community to extend the
gambit of universality to cover these crimes as it became apparent
that only by giving national courts jurisdiction over any person ac-
cused of terrorism could the fight against it be successfully waged.
The first of the notable measures, the 1970 Convention for the Sup-
pression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 62 while providing both pro-
tective and territorial jurisdiction, also sounded a call for universality
by mandating that no "criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance
with national law" is excluded.63 In short, this provision affords those
countries whose national legislation creates universal jurisdiction over
terrorist acts the right to prosecute these offenders alongside those
countries claiming territorial or protective jurisdiction.64 Identical
provisions were also drafted in the Montreal Convention for the Sup-
pression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation
(Sabotage)65 and the 1963 Tokyo Convention on offenses and certain
s Sept. 4, 1956, 266 U.N.T.S. 3.
56 Osofsky, supra note 44, at 196.
57 See id.
" Adopted Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 244.
59 See Osofsky, supra note 44, at 196.
60 See idL
61 See id
62 Opened for signature Dec. 16, 1970, 10 I.L.M. 133.
63 Id. at 134.
64 See Osofsky, supra note 44, at 197.
65 Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565,974 U.N.T.S. 177.
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other acts committed on board aircraft.66 In 1977, the member states
of the Council of Europe signed the Convention on the Suppression of
Terrorism, article 6 of which provides universal jurisdiction by man-
dating that the Convention does not exclude any form of jurisdiction
"exercised in accordance with national law" and by requiring each
signatory to "take such measures as may be necessary to establish its
jurisdiction.., in the case where the suspected offender is present in
its territory and it does not extradite hin. '67 Terrorism was drawn
further under the wing of universality in 1979 with the International
Convention against the Taking of Hostages, which drew on the prin-
ciples adopted by the States of the Council of Europe two years ear-
lier.68 Aside from providing territorial, nationality, protective, and
passive personality jurisdictions, signatories to this convention are
also bound to either prosecute alleged offenders or extradite them
69
when found in their territory.
The scope of national courts' jurisdiction over heinous crimes
was again expanded in 1984 as the international community sought to
curb the use of torture as a means of wreaking havoc upon the civilian
population. The means implemented was the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment.70 Signatories to this Convention look to article 5, which es-
tablishes jurisdiction:
(a) When the offences are committed in any territory under
its jurisdiction... ; (b) When the alleged offender is a na-
tional of that State; (c) When the victim is a national of that
State if that State considers it appropriate. 2. Each State
Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary
to establish its jurisdiction over such offences in cases where
the alleged offender is present in any territory under its juris-
diction and it does not extradite him .... 3. This Conven-
tion does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in
accordance with internal law.7t
These all-inclusive jurisdictional requirements, as well as those in-
volving the suppression of terrorism, provide an excellent indication
of the power the international community has given to national courts
66 Done Sept 14, 1963,704 U.N.T.S. 219 (entered into force Dec. 4, 1969).
67 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report on the European Convention on the Suppres-
sion of Terrorism, art. 6 (Jan. 27, 1977).
6 Adopted Dec. 17, 1979, 18 LL.M. 1456.
69 See id. at 1458; see also Osofsky, supra note 44, at 197.
70 G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/72 (1984).
71 id. at art. 5.
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to try the most egregious of crimes against humanity committed by
the most notorious of individuals.
The most recent implementations of universality can be viewed in
creations of ad hoc international tribunals designed to punish those
associated with humanitarian violations in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda. United Nations Security Council Resolutions 808 in 1993
and 955 in 1994 created the International Criminal Tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, respectively. 72  These Resolutions
not only gave the tribunals jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide,
crimes against humanity, and expanded war crimes definitions, but
also mandated that all U.N. signatories were obligated to cooperate
with the requests and directives of the tribunals-no doubt a symbol
of the universal movement against complacency and impunity when
basic human rights are violated.73 In one of the more celebrated cases
before the Yugoslavia tribunal, Prosecutor v. Tadc,74 the court went
on record as saying:
It would be a travesty of law and a betrayal of the universal
need for justice, should the concept of State sovereignty be
allowed to be raised successfully against human rights. Bor-
ders should not be considered as a shield against the reach of
the law and as a protection for those who trample underfoot
the most elementary rights of humanity.75
In further commentary, the court went to write:
[T]hat the crimes which the International Tribunal has been
called upon to try are not crimes of a purely domestic nature.
They are really crimes which are universal in nature, well
recognised in international law as serious breaches of inter-
national humanitarian law, and transcending the interest of
any one State.76
72 See Henry T. King, Nuremberg to Rome: A Critical Review of the Recent U.N. Treaty
Negotiations at Rome in Light of the Vision of Justice Robert H. Jackson, Address at Case
Western Reserve University School of Law (Nov. 1998) [hereinafter Nuremberg to Rome]
(outline on file with the Case Western Reserve Law Review). The creation of tribunals to try
human rights abuses in these states has led many to question why they were not created in
countries such as Somalia, Chechnya, Cambodia, or in the Persian Gulf. Unfortunately, the
answer lies not in a disparity of the atrocities, but rather in the meeting room of the United Na-
tions Security Council, where politics and the veto often reign over humanity. See Bartram S.
Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National Courts and
International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 383, 386 (1998).
73 See Brown, supra note 72, at 395-96.
74 35 LL.M. 32 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia 1995).
75 Id at 52.
76 ld.
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Yet, by far the most monumental achievement of those seeking to
bring the notorious malefactors of human rights to justice is the crea-
tion of the International Criminal Court (ICC) this past July. Based
upon the principles which guided the drafters at Nuremberg, article 5
mandates that the ICC's jurisdiction is limited "to the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole," spe-
cifically, genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes
of aggression (once a more suitable definition is agreed upon by the
ICC signatories). 77 Not surprisingly, one of the ICC's least contro-
versial principles during the negotiations is its inclusion of article 27
which provides accountability for all persons, including heads of
state, for their crimes.7 8 While the ICC is still hindered by some
limitations, which will later be discussed, its passage signifies the
continued belief that the veil of states' sovereignty has been pierced
and universality is here to stay.
In addition to the conventions and United Nations declarations
and resolutions that have codified this principle, universality has also
acquired credibility in the realm of the international customary law of
human rights. Customary law has been generally recognized as re-
flecting how worldwide general "practices long accepted as obliga-
tory acquire the status of rules of law."79 The appeal of this doctrine
for human rights advocates is that it allows judges and jurists to infer
these principles from an "'international consensus,' independent of
any official acts of governments." 80 While customary law used to
play a larger role in the rudimentary legal systems, it currently tends
to reflect the developing beliefs or aspirations in societies around the
world as viewed through the works of conventions, declarations,
proclamations, and the works of scholars and jurists. Today, many
scholars refer to this process as "instant customary law" as human
rights activists and world leaders seek to make an end run on the
cumbersome process of attending, negotiating, signing and ratifying
treaties and conventions.81 Whether this customary law can emerge
as a serious obstacle for Pinochet supporters remains to be seen.
77 See United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court) at art. 5
(visited Sept. 17, 1999) <http://www.un.org/law/icclstatuteromefra.htm> [hereinafter Rome
Statute].
7' See id. at art. 27.
79 Jeremy Rabkin, First They Came for Pinochet, WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 23, 1998, at
26.
80 Id. at 27.
", Id. at 26.
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B. United States and Universality: Lagging Behind
While the world community has steadily progressed in its ac-
ceptance of universal jurisdiction, the United States' reluctance to
relinquish its own sovereignty and its subsequent failure to ratify
many human rights treaties has allowed the world's policeman and
supposed moral pedagogical leader to be bypassed in the movement
to implement universal jurisdiction. Despite this overall apathy, there
are noted exceptions both in statutory and caselaw.82 Although uni-
versal jurisdiction existed on U.S. law books as early as 1819 for pi-
racy, the first true codification of the principle came in 1974 with the
Antihijacking Act 83 passed pursuant to its obligations under the Con-
vention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft. 84 The
Antihijacking Act helped break the shackles of territoriality that had
until this time governed U.S. criminal jurisdiction, as prosecutions
could now go forward regardless of the nationality of the offender or
the locale of incident.85 In 1984, the U.S. fulfilled its obligations un-
der the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages by
passing the Taking of Hostages Act.86 The most important clause of
this act for the purposes of universality read that the U.S. could exer-
cise jurisdiction if "'the offender is found in the United States."' 87
While "universality" as a term of art is not used, the act's wording
clearly allows prosecution notwithstanding the fact that there are no
territorial or nationality ties to the offender.88 One of the few cases to
apply the universality principle to international actions was United
States v. Yunis,89 wherein the court ruled that the Acts in question
provided enough jurisdiction over the offender in spite of the fact that
he was forcibly brought within U.S. territory. 90
The United States' next milestone, and a long awaited one, came
in 1988 when it finally ratified the Geneva Convention. Though her-
alded by human rights activists, the ratification was so heavily laden
82 See Osofsky, supra note 44, at 198-293 (detailing Congress' limited codification of
universal jurisdiction and the federal courts' treatment of international law).
" Antihijacking Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-366, 88 Stat. 409 (1974).
4 Openedfor signature Dec. 16, 1970, 10 LL.M. 133; see also Osofsky, supra note 44, at
199 (explaining that "[tihe Antihijacking Act [was] passed to implement U.S. obligations under
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful seizure of Aircraft").
85 See Osofsky, supra note 44, at 199.
86 Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage-Taking (Hostage Tak-
ing Act), Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2186 (1984).
870sofsky, supra note 44, at 200 (quoting the Hostage Taking Act § 1203, 98 Stat. at
2186).
8 See id. at 200.
s 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
90 See id. at 1090 (holding that the Hostage Takings Act provided the basis for exercising
U.S. jurisdiction over the defendant, accused of hijacking a Royal Jordinian Airlines flight).
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with restrictions that its punch was effectively nullified.91 Of more
significance was the 1994 modification of the U.S. criminal code "to
provide that any U.S. national or person physically located within the
United States could be held criminally liable for torture he or she
commits anywhere against anyone."92 Adhering to its obligations
under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment, this change increased the United States' reli-
ance on universal jurisdiction and complemented existing legislation
designed to protect the rights of its citizens in civil suits, such as the
Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)93 and the Torture Victim Protection
Act of 199194 (TVPA).95  An additional statute passed in 1996, the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),96 is not
quite universal in nature, yet its criminalization of "conduct outside of
the United States that created harm or risk of harm to people and
property in the United States," further evidences the break from
strictly territorial criminal jurisdiction.97
Unfortunately, acts such as the ATCA, TVPA, AEDPA, and the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act provide U.S. courts with jurisdic-
tion only over civil actions by aliens for torts "'committed in violation
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.' ' '98 In this vein,
U.S courts have provided civil remedies for those torts committed in
violation of customary international human rights laws abroad.99
These cases have included causes of action for torture, genocide, war
crimes, disappearances, executions, prolonged arbitrary detention,
and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.'°° As one author points
out, "[s]ince the torts being adjudicated often have no connection to
the American forum, the only applicable jurisdictional base is univer-
sal."101 Despite these advancements in the civil arena, criminal juris-
diction outside the U.S. remains limited to the few aforementioned
91 See Monica L. McHam, All's Well That Ends Well: A Pragmatic Look at International
Criminal Extradition, 20 Hous. J. INT'L L. 419,429 (1998).
92 Osofsky, supra note 44, at 191 (citing Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No.
103-236 § 506(a), 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (Supp. 11 1997)).
9' 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (Supp. 1111997).
94 Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992).
95 See Osofsky, supra note 44, at 209-11 (detailing the U.S. national civil regime for
addressing severe human rights violations).
96 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (Supp. 1 1997).
9' Id. at 200.
98 Id. at 210 (quoting 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (vest 1994)).
" Seeid.at210.
100 See id; see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Kadic v. Karadzic,
70 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir. 1995); Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 716 (9th Cir.
1992); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 177 (D. Mass. 1995); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672
F. Supp 1531, 1539 (N.D. Cal. 1987). Each of these courts found that government-sponsored
torture violated the international law of nations.
101 Osofsky, supra note 44, at 210.
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ratified treaties and conventions.102 Although the Restatement (Third)
of the Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. explicitly recognizes univer-
sal jurisdiction for such crimes as hijacking, genocide, war crimes,
and certain acts of terrorism, and maintains that this category is an
ever-expanding one, the U.S. fears that in order to pierce other states'
sovereignties it will have to give up some of its own. It is thus re-
luctant to fully embrace universality in criminal jurisdiction. 10 3
C. European States and Universality: Britain, Spain, and
France
In Europe, the concept of universality appears to be on stronger
footing with respect to criminal jurisdiction than it is in the United
States. Britain's Criminal Justice Act of 1988,1°4 for instance, allows
the prosecution of a public official or private figure for torture, re-
gardless of his nationality and without regard to the location of the
offense. 0 5 Enacted to fulfill Britain's obligations under the Conven-
tion Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment, its language is central in the Pinochet case. Lawyers in that
case do not question the universal nature of the act, but rather whether
the phrase "public official" ought to be interpreted to include heads of
state or former heads of state. French caselaw has also adopted uni-
versality for criminal offenses, as the courts explicitly endorsed it in
the extradition of Klaus Barbie.1° Israel also made use of the princi-
ple in the extradition of Adolf Eichmann.'07 Spain, too, has passed
the necessary legislation and signed the relevant treaties granting its
courts jurisdiction to try the most heinous of crimes even when they
occur outside its borders and when Spain has no nationality ties to the
offenders or the victims.' °8 The Organic Law of Judicial Power
(OLJP), passed in 1985, is one such law granting Spanish courts ju-
risdiction over crimes committed by its nationals or aliens outside its
territory including genocide, terrorism, and torture, as well as any
other crimes that Spain has jurisdiction over due to international trea-
ties or conventions.10 9 Aside from ratifying the Genocide Convention
in 1968, Spain also ratified the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 1987 and
102 See icL at211.
103 See id. at 215-19.
104 cl. 33 (Eng.).
1o5 See Osofsky, supra note 44, at 216.
106 See The Pinochet Case: Bringing the General to Justice, ECONOMIST, Nov. 28, 1998, at
24.
107 See id
1o3 See id.
109 See Derechos Report, supra note 24.
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International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (also prohibit-
ing torture), and has incorporated these treaties into its Penal Code. °
D. Universal Jurisdiction is Here to Stay
The Court in Prosecutor v. Tadic' summed up the movement
toward worldwide expansion and codification of the principle of uni-
versal jurisdiction well when it held that "sovereign rights of States
cannot and should not take precedence over the right of the interna-
tional community to act appropriately as [crimes against humanity]
affect the whole of mankind and shock the conscience of all nations
of the world."'1 2 This assertion captured the sense that the "[c]lassical
notions of sovereignty have faded" in light of the "interdependence"
of the world community." 3 For years, the most egregious offenders
of humanity have continually escaped justice while international law
and customary humanitarian law have struggled to realize that some
norms transcend the artificial territorial borders of nation states.
Spain's arrest and attempted extradition of General Augusto Pinochet
signals a willingness to treat even the most notorious malefactors of
humanity as "'enem[ies] of all mankind"' 4 and no longer "lend le-
gitimacy to [their] terrible abuses."" 5 This willingness has even been
endorsed by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, a sure sign that in-
ternational law is on the right track." 6 Having endured many trials
and tribulations since the days of Nuremberg, the successful extradi-
tion and trial of Pinochet will once and for all prove that the detrac-
tors of Nuremberg were dead wrong when they stated that "Nurem-
berg 'would be a blot on the American record which we shall long
regret.' 1 u7
110 See id.
.' 35 LL.M. 32 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia 1995)
112 Id. at52.
113 Patricia A. McKeon, An International Criminal Court: Balancing the Principle of Sov-
ereignty Against the Demands for International Justice, 12 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT.
535,541 (1997).
4 Osofsky, supra note 44, at 226 (quoting Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d
Cir. 1980)).
"t' Id. at 204.
116 See Rabkin, supra note 79, at 26.
117 Nuremberg to Rome, supra note 72 (quoting Senator Robert Taft).
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I1. EX PARTE PINOCHET
We have (in Pinochet) one of the most horrendous criminals
of the 20th century... here in our country. We have an ex-
tradition treaty. Spain has jurisdiction under international
law. Quite frankly, I don't see what the fuss is about."8
On October 16, 1998, Baltasar Garzon, an investigating magis-
trate from Madrid, Spain issued a provisional arrest warrant, pursuant
to section 8(1)(b) of Britain's Extradition Act of 1989, for General
Augusto Pinochet, former Chilean Head of State, who was then re-
covering from back surgery in London.119 The warrant asserted that
during the period between September 11, 1973 and December 31,
1983, Pinochet had murdered seventy-nine Spanish citizens in Chile,
people over whom Spain claimed passive personality jurisdiction un-
der its 1985 Organic Law of Judicial Power and its 1971 Code of
Military Justice. However, as Britain's national laws do not recog-
nize passive personality as a valid assertion of jurisdiction, and coun-
tries normally refuse to extradite unless each finds the act punishable
and hence extraditable, the first act was destined to be found defective
for want of mutuality. 20  Within days, Garzon presented a second
arrest warrant and extradition request, charging the former leader with
genocide, torture, hostage taking, conspiracy to commit torture, con-
spiracy to take hostages, and conspiracy to commit murder.12 1 The
accompanying extradition request read:
'Offences ... [were] committed, by Augusto Pinochet Ug-
arte, along with others in accordance with the plan previously
established and designed for the systematic elimination of the
political opponents, specific segments of sections of the Chil-
ean national groups, ethnic and religious groups, in order to
118 Spain's Courts to Rule on Pinochet: Judges to Decide Legality of Requesting Extradi-
tion from London, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 21, 1998, at 24A (quoting Oxford University interna-
tional law specialist Michael Byers).
119 See Regina v. Evans (Q.B. Div'l Ct. 1998) (Eng.), reprinted in Sovereign Immunity for
Former Head of State, LONDON TIMEs, Nov. 3, 1998, at 47.
120 See The Pinochet Case: Bringing the General to Justice, supra note 106, at 24. The
provisional arrest warrant failed to meet any of the defined types of extradition crimes as deline-
ated in section 2 of the 1989 Extradition Act. Section 2(l)(a), territorial jurisdiction, was not
met as the murders prompting the arrest warrant were not committed in Spain; Spain thus had
no territorial jurisdiction and could not claim jurisdiction under that principle. Section 2(l)(b)
was not satisfied as, unlike Spain, Britain could only try a defendant for a crime committed
outside its territory if the defendant was its own citizen. Section 3(l)(a), nationality jurisdiction,
was not satisfied since Spain was not basing its jurisdictional claim on Pinochet's nationality
and passive personality did not suffice. See Extradition Act, 1989, ch. 33, § 2 (Eng.).
121 See The Pinochet Case: Bringing the General to Justice, supra note 106, at 24.
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remove any ideological dispute and purify the Chilean way of
life through the disappearance and death of the most promi-
nent leaders and other elements which defended Socialist,
Communist (Marxist) positions, or who simply disagreed.'1 22
In short, the second warrant asserted jurisdiction under the principle
of universality, arguing that the ordering of others to commit system-
atic large scale torture, hostage taking, and murder constituted either
genocide or crimes against humanity for which universal jurisdiction
mandated punishment or extradition by any country having in perso-
nam jurisdiction. Pinochet's lawyers quickly responded that as a
former head of state, he enjoyed immunity from arrest and extradition
while in Britain with respect to any of his official functions or acts
committed while in power.123 Two issues thus emerged for Britain's
judiciary to decide: (1) Does Pinochet enjoy continuing immunity for
acts that he committed while head of state?; and (2) Do Britain's laws
or customary international law grant it the jurisdiction it needs in or-
der to extradite Pinochet to Spain?
A. Baltasar Garzon: A Spanish Elliot Ness?
Magistrate Garzon's involvement in investigations in South
America began over two years ago in Argentina at the request of sev-
eral non-profit Spanish legal societies.124 During this time he has ac-
tively investigated similar types of crimes against humanity, namely
executions and disappearances, committed against Spanish citizens by
Argentina's military government during its rule from 1976-1983.12
Having ruled on June 28, 1996 that Spain's Central Instructing Court
of National Audience had the requisite jurisdiction to investigate
these crimes in Argentina, Garzon is best known for issuing the Octo-
ber 1997 arrest warrant for Argentinean Navy Captain Adolfo Scil-
122 Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte, 4 All E.R.
897 (H.L. 1998) [hereinafter Exparte Pinochet 1] (appeal taken from Q.B. Div'l Ct.). Partici-
pating in the appeal were Lords Slynn of Hadley, Lloyd of Berwick, Nicholls of Birkenhead,
Steyn, and Hoffman. See id.
See The Pinochet Case: Bringing the General to Justice, supra note 106, at 24.
124 See Marlise Simons, Pinochet's Spanish Pursuer: Magistrate of Explosive Cases, N.Y.
TmsS, Oct. 19, 1998, at Al [hereinafter Pinochet's Spanish Pursuer]. In 1996, the Spanish
Progressive Union of Prosecutors essentially began the investigations into the atrocities corn-
mitted in Argentina and Chile when they filed criminal complaints against these states. See
Derechos Report, supra note 24.
125 See Derechos Report, supra note 24. Although Spain was the first country to actively
seek the prosecutions of Argentinean military officials for their actions during this time period,
the Italian League for Rights and Liberations of People was among the first to consider the idea.
The investigations were postponed in the late 1980s, however, as Argentina began prosecuting
the responsible individuals on its own accord as democracy regained its hold on the country.
See id.
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ingo pursuant to these investigations. 126 Often quoted as insisting that
"'[w]e have a moral debt with the relatives of hundreds of victims,"'
Garzon's investigations have in the past been received with animosity
in light of the amnesties or pardons granted to Argentinean officials
guilty of the crimes. 127 At the urging of groups such as the Agrupa-
cion de Familiares de Detenidos y Desaparecidos de Chile (Chilean
Group of Relatives of Detained and Disappeared People) and Iz-
quierda Unida (United Left), Garzon expanded his investigations to
include those atrocities committed during Pinochet's reign, the deci-
sion to issue the arrest warrant coming nearly six months after he ini-
tially began the investigation.
128
This was despite condemnation from several camps, including
Chile's government (especially among the right-wing elitists from
whom Pinochet receives most of his support,)129 former British Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher, who views the ex-despot as a former ally
in the Falklands War,130 and several U.S. Senators such as Jesse
Helms who believe that Chile made a conscious decision to forgive
and forget Pinochet's abuses in exchange for democratic elections.
31
On October 31, 1998, Garzon cleared his biggest obstacle as an
eleven-member panel of Spain's National Court issued an unappeal-
able decision that Spain could bring charges against Pinochet.
13 2
Prior to the decision, Spain's Prime Minister, Jose Maria Aznar, gave
a formal acquiescence to seek extradition, albeit a lukewarm one.
133
Simultaneous to these proceedings, Garzon began receiving world-
'26 See id.
127 Pinochet's Spanish Pursuer, supra note 124, at Al.
128 See Derechos Report, supra note 24.
129 See Faiola, supra note 16, at A20.
130 See John Deane et al., Pinochet Lawyers Launch Bid for Freedom, Oct. 22, 1998,
available in LEXIS, U.K. Press Association Newsfile.
131 In an editorial in the Washington Post, Helms asserted that:
The Chilean people took stock of Pinochet's legacy.., and made a conscious deci-
sion to move on .... Now comes Baltasar Garzon, who has arbitrarily decided he
will overrule their decision .... The new system of global "justice" being created
here is arbitrary and capricious. The same day that Pinochet was arrested in Lon-
don, Spain's prime minister was clinking glasses with Fidel Castro at the Ibero-
American summit .... [l]f Garzon succeeds, there will be no more "peaceful transi-
tions to democracy." If dictators cannot be offered amnesty or safety in exile, they
will never hand power to democratic movements. The incentive will be for greater
repression, not less.
Jesse Helms, And After Pinochet?, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 1998, at A31.
132 See Marlise Simons, Judges in Spain Affirm Pinochet Can Face a Genocide Trial; N.Y.
TtMEs, Oct. 31, 1998, at A6 [hereinafter Judges in Spain].
133 See Pinochet's Spanish Pursuer, supra note 124, at Al. Aznar is reputed to disapprove
of the investigations but feels he cannot call for their end in light of the National Court's ruling.
See id.
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wide support for his actions in the form of similar extradition requests
for Pinochet from at least seven countries.
134
In addition to echoing the arguments made by Pinochet's British
lawyers, Chile responded to these developments by asserting that the
arrest violated Chilean sovereignty as Pinochet had been granted im-
munity under its Amnesty Law of 1978 and that Spain lacked juris-
diction over the crime of genocide since it did not cover attacks on
political groups. 135  Furthermore, Foreign Minister Jose Miguel In-
sulza has insisted that Pinochet can only receive "symbolic" justice in
Britain or Spain and thus should be returned to Chile where "some
kind of justice" might be had.136  Unfazed, Spanish officials have
countered that the extension of the definition of genocide to cover
attacks on political groups is "in the spirit" of the Genocide Conven-
tion, that Chile's Amnesty Law carries no weight outside of Chile,
and that its assertion of jurisdiction parallels the manner through
which the United States tries hijackers and terrorists who commit
crimes abroad. 137 As such, their case is supported by numerous bod-
ies of international jurisprudence: the 1992 U.N. General Assembly
declaration on the "disappeared," European Convention on the Pre-
vention of Torture, the Genocide Convention, and the Nuremberg
Tribunal Charter of 1945.138
B. Round One: The Queen's Bench
On November 3, 1998, General Pinochet won the first legal battle
in Britain's courts when the Queen's Bench decreed that as a former
head of state, Pinochet enjoyed continuing immunity with respect to
134 France, for example, has issued a warrant for Pinochet's arrest. See France Asks Britain
to Arrest Ex-Dictator Pinochet, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTER, Nov. 3, 1998, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Deutsche Presse-Agentur File. The French warrant, issued by Magis-
trate Roger Le Loire, charges Pinochet with the disappearances and probable murders of
Frenchmen Rene Chanfreau, Etienne Pesle, and Marcel Aniel-Baquet. France's extradition
request raised eyebrows for two reasons: (1) preferring to avoid the extradition battle with
which Britain is now faced, France, tipped off to Garzon's plans, denied Pinochet's request to
enter the country for his back surgery; and (2) France is one of a few countries whose laws
allow it to try suspected criminals in absentia, a power it used in the trial of Alfredo Astiz, an
Argentinean Naval officer accused of murdering two French nuns. See Marlise Simons, Spain
Says It's Neutral on Pinochet; Signs Are Othenvise, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 21, 1998, at A14 [herein-
after Spain Says It's Neutral]; Judges in Spain, supra note 132, at A6.
135 See Giles Tremlett, Spanish Court May Release Pinochet, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Oct.
25, 1998, at30.
116 Hoge, supra note 43, at A10.
117 Mark Steyn, If Pinochet is Guilty Then so is Her Majesty the Queen, SUNDAY
TELEGRAPH, Nov. 29, 1998, at 37; see also Robert Pear, Officials Accused of Atrocities Losing
Places to Hide, Scholars Say, N.Y. TImS, OcL 19, 1998, at AS (detailing treatment of govern-
mental officials accused of crimes against humanity).
138 See David Buchan and Jimmy Bums, A Trap for Tyrants, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1998, at
18.
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all public acts committed during his tenure. 139 In reaching this deci-
sion, the lower court relied on section 20(1) of the State Immunity
Act of 1978 when read with article 39(2) of Schedule 1 to the Diplo-
matic Immunities Act of 1964, which incorporated the principles of
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 19611 4 In short,
the tribunal found that these provisions conferred similar immunity:
[O]n a head of state or a former head of state as on a head or
former head of a diplomatic mission; and that after ceasing to
be so, a head of state ceased to enjoy immunity in respect of
personal or private acts but continued to enjoy immunity in
respect of public acts performed by him as head of state.
141
Since the acts with which Pinochet is charged relate to actions carried
out while he was the Chilean head of state, he was thus immune from
prosecution. 14z
The lower court was similarly unpersuaded with the prosecu-
tion's assertion that the crimes were so repugnant to morality that
they constituted the kinds of crimes against humanity for which any-
one could be liable. 143 While the prosecution argued that Pinochet
could be tried for genocide, torture, and the taking of hostages, the
court chose to cursorily dismiss these claims. The court found that in
Britain, heads of state could not be held liable for the crime of geno-
cide because Britain, in adopting the provisions of the Genocide Con-
vention in its Genocide Act of 1969, did not incorporate article IV,
the provision calling for unlimited liability regardless of one's posi-
tion as head of state.144 Similarly, it held that the acts which incorpo-
rated the conventions on terrorism and torture failed to include provi-
sions expressly mandating that heads of state could be liable for the
delineated crimes.145 Though a blow to claims of an emerging norm
139 See Regina v. Evans (Q.B. Div'l Ct. 1998) (Eng.), reprinted in Sovereign Immunity for
Former Head of State, LONDON TMES, Nov. 3, 1998, at 47.
140 See id.
141 I&; see also State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, § 20(1) (Eng.); Diplomatic Privileges
Act, 1964, ch. 81, §§ 1-2, sched. 1, art. 39(2) (Eng.) (incorporating the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations of 1961).
142 See Evans, reprinted in Sovereign Immunity for Former Head of State, LONDON TIMES,
Nov. 3, 1998, at 47.
143 See id.
144 See id.; see also Genocide Act, 1969, ch. 12, § 1 (Eng.); Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. Article IV
reads: "Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be
punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private indi-
viduals." Id. at 280.
145 See Evans, reprinted in Sovereign Immunity for Former Head of State, LONDON TIMES,
Nov. 3, 1998, at 47; see also Taking of Hostages Act, 1982, ch. 28, § 1 (Eng.); Criminal Justice
Act, 1988, ch. 33, § 134 (Eng.) (omitting provisions extending liability to heads of state for such
crimes).
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that former leaders can be held liable for their crimes against human-
ity, the case was soon destined for appeal.
C. Recognizing the Norm in the House of Lords
Following numerous days of testimony before the House of
Lords, a five-judge panel reversed the lower court by a vote of three
to two, holding that Pinochet enjoyed no immunity as a former head
of state and could thus be extradited to Spain pending approval of the
Home Secretary.146 Though clearly a recognition and acceptance of
the principle that, through universality, heads of state can be found
liable for such gross humanitarian violations while in office, such a
close split of the court might be seen as indicia of the precarious hold
on this position the issue possesses. However, a close examination of
the opinions, especially those of the two dissenting Lords, reveals
several indications that their positions are not on as solid a foundation
as they first appear. In fact, these opinions even seem to foreshadow
the inevitability that former heads of state may be forced to answer
for their crimes against humanity on a much wider scale. In order to
view this phenomenon, however, it is necessary to break down the
House of Lords' decision and analyze the components of each Lord's
opinion in conjunction with those that fell on the other side of coin.
1. Immunity and the Common Law
In ruling on the point of immunity, all five Lords concurred with
the divisional court's assessment that the relevant statutes and sec-
tions were contained in the 1978 State Immunity Act, 1964 Diplo-
matic Privileges Act, and the Articles of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations which had been incorporated in the schedule of
the 1964 act. In fact, all five agreed that section 20(1) of the 1978
Act ought to be read with Articles 29, 31(1), and 39(2) of the Vienna
Convention. 47 Article 20(1) states that "the Diplomatic Privileges
Act [ofl 1964 shall apply to (a) a sovereign or other head of State.' ' 4
Article 29 mandates that "[tihe person of a diplomatic agent shall be
inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or deten-
tion."' 14 9 This article serves as the basis for article 3 1(1), which states
that "[a] diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal ju-
risdiction of the receiving State."'' 50 Having established this immu-
14 See Exparte PinochetL 4 All E.R. 897 (H.L. 1998).
147 See id
148 State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, § 20(1) (Eng.).
14 Diplomatic Privileges Act, 1964, ch. 81, § 2, sched. 1, art. 29 (Eng.) (incorporating the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961).
'5" Id. at art. 3 1.
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nity for members of the diplomatic community, the Lords then sought
to apply it to heads of state and former heads of state via article 39(2),
which states:
When the functions of a person enjoying privileges and im-
munities have come to an end, such privileges and immuni-
ties shall normally cease at the moment when he leaves the
country, or on expiry of a reasonable period in which to do
so, but shall subsist until that time, even in case of armed
conflict. However, with respect to acts performed by such a
person in the exercise of his functions as a member of the
mission, immunity shall continue to subsist.
151
When read with the aforementioned articles and section of the 1978
Act, the Lords were in agreement that the phrases "diplomatic agent"
and "member of the mission" could be interchanged with "heads of
state," thus technically providing immunity for a former head of
state's functions committed while in office.152 At this point, the
Lords' opinions diverge, with each emphasizing different doctrines.
Lords Slynn and Lloyd, dissenting, turn first to interpretations of
the common law to support Pinochet's immunity claim. In particular,
they draw on several scholars' attempts to deal with this issue. For
example, Oppenheim's International Law was cited by Lord Slynn
for its proposition that a former head of state, "'[for his official acts
as Head of State he will, like any other agent of a state, enjoy con-
tinuing immunity." ' 153 Lord Lloyd also makes reference to the ap-
pellants' own brief, which reads:
'No international agreement specifically provides for the
immunities of a former head of state. However, under cus-
tomary international law, it is accepted that a state is entitled
to expect that its former head of state will not be subjected to
the jurisdiction of the courts of another state for certain cate-
gories of acts performed while he was head of state ....
Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Practice, cited by Lords Slynn and
Lloyd, echoes these sentiments in its assertion that a head of state
who has resigned is "'entitled to continuing immunity in regard to
acts which he performed while head of state, provided that the acts
151 Id. at art. 39(2).
152 See Exparte Pinochet ,4 All E.R. 897, at 906-08.
,S3 Id. at 910 (quoting OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 456 (Sir Robert Jennings &
Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992)).
'54 Id. at 923.
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were performed in his official capacity. ' '155 The Lords close their
opinion with a look at the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the U.S., which notes the immunities that former heads
of state have sought for their official actions, and found that
"'[o]rdinarily, such acts are not within the jurisdiction to prescribe of
other states.' ,
156
Lords Slynn and Lloyd also support Pinochet's immunity case
by drawing on the Act of State doctrine. 157 While not a codified law,
this widely accepted judge-made law is based mainly on the principle
that a "'sovereign can do no wrong."",15 8 When applied, states' courts
refuse to adjudicate the actions of another's sovereign for the acts
committed in the sovereign's country. Thus, the dissenters argue that,
as British judges, they cannot sit in judgment on actions that were
committed in Chile by Pinochet. 159 This assertion is supported by
Duke of Brunswick v. King of Hanover1 60 which held that a "'foreign
Sovereign, coming into this country, cannot be made responsible here
for an act done in his sovereign character in his own country; whether
it be an act right or wrong."'" 6' This rationale was also incorporated
in Oppenheim's, which states that "[c]ourts of one State do not, as a
rule, question the validity or legality of the official acts of another
Sovereign State."'
162
Looking at these findings alone, one might easily become con-
vinced that an international norm holding former heads of state liable
for the crimes they committed against humanity while in office is not
emerging. Yet, each of these sources of law contains a similar fallacy
that critically undermines the position of the dissenting Lords. In
short, in establishing immunity for former heads of state these sources
all include a provision limiting the immunity to "official acts," "pub-
liec functions," or actions committed in "official capacity." While
seemingly an out for heads of state, the Lords then qualify these
1SS Id. at 910 (quoting SIR ERNESt SATOW, SATOW'S GUIDE TO DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE 10
(5th ed. 1979)).
156 Id. at 924 (quoting RESTATFAMNT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF Tti
UNITED STATES § 464 reporters' note 14 (1987)).
157 Although mentioned in both of the dissenting Lords' opinions, the act is never ex-
pressly used as a justification because the Lords feel that since Pinochet is immune under the
statutory and common law, there is no need to implement the doctrine. See id. at 910-11, 925-
27.
158 Id. at 918 (quoting Banco Nacionat de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 855 (2d Cir.
1962)).
"S' See id. at 918-19, 934-35.
160 9 Eng. Rep. 993 (H.L 1848).
161 See Exparte Pinochet , 4 All E.R. 897, at 909 (quoting id. at 998-99).
16 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 365 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds.,
9th ed. 1992); see also Hatch v. Baez, 7 Hun. 596, 597 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1876) (requiring physical
presence within a jurisdiction in order to be subject to that jurisdiction's laws).
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statements by positing that the principle of immunity still must be
continuously viewed "in the light of developments in international
law relating to what are called international crimes," an indication
that some public acts may not warrant immunity or that some acts
may not be considered public/official. 163 This curtailed immunity is
particularly evidenced by the quotation from the appellants' own brief
which states that a former head of state can expect immunity in for-
eign nations for "'certain categories of acts. ' 164 The Restatement
also hedges on this immunity by saying that "ordinarily" official ac-
tions are the subject of immunity. 165 In not one instance do any of the
cited sources implement wide scale immunity for "all" official or
public acts. As it is already well established law that heads of state
are not immune from personal acts or public actions committed for
personal gain while in power,166 the negative implication that results
from the failure to provide such blanket immunity can only be that for
certain types of public acts immunity does not exist. Consciously or
unconsciously, this sample of jurisprudence thus recognizes the pos-
sible need to withhold heads of states' immunity in certain instances
due to the nature of their action, a phenomenon in accordance with
the principles of universality.
A second fallacy emerges when one attempts to reconcile the
phrases "public acts," "official acts," and "official capacity" with the
crimes of which Pinochet is accused. It is on this point that the three
majority Lords choose to focus their argument, insisting that acts of
torture and terrorism do not fit into these categories.167 Lord Nicholls
proffers the view that the immunity conferred by article 39(2) of the
Vienna Convention is done so "in respect of acts performed in the
exercise of functions which international law recognises as functions
of a head of state.' ' 168 This view is strikingly similar to the qualifying
language of the dissenters with respect of the need to continually
monitor the growing body of internationally condemned crimes, a
further indication that the category of public acts is limited.169 As the
163 SeeExpartePinochetI,4AlIE.R. at 911.
164 Id. at 923 (quoting appellants' brief 26).
165 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
464 reporters' note 14 (1987).
,66 See Ex parte Pinochet , 4 All E.R. at 923-24; see also Underhill v. Hernandez, 168
U.S. 250, 254 (1897); Hilao v. Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1470-72 (9th Cir. 1994); Jimenez v.
Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 557-58 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp.
1506, 1521-23 (S.D. Ha. 1990), affd, 117 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 1997). Each of these courts
found sovereign immunity for former heads of state only for their actions under the auspices of
their power and not for personal gain.
167 See Exparte Pinochet I, 4 All E.R. at 944-45.
'6 Id. at 939.
169 Seeid.atgll.
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crimes of terrorism and torture have been the subject of numerous
international conventions and national statutes mandating that na-
tional courts accept universal jurisdiction over these crimes, it is clear
that they cannot be considered as part of the definition of official or
public acts.' 70 To do so, Lord Nicholls insists, would make a "mock-
ery of international law," as these crimes are the latest addition to a
list of condemned actions that began following World War II at Nur-
emberg.17 1 Rather, these acts must fall into the category of unpro-
tected private acts carried out in an effort to maintain a stranglehold
on the country.
In an attempt to counter that argument, the dissenting Lords ap-
pear to reason that by allowing the growing list of international
crimes to serve as a weathervane for which a head of state's actions
can be deemed official or public, the majority has created a slippery
slope upon which a head of state will slowly lose his power. In order
to avoid this type of infringement, they assert that no line can or must
be drawn to differentiate between public and private acts. 72 Yet, in
making this assertion, the dissenters have contradicted history and
international jurisprudence since, under their line of thought, even
atrocities such as those committed by Hitler would be viewed as im-
mune official acts, a view that Nuremberg quickly eroded. 173 History
has thus put heads of state on notice that the depravity of their "offi-
cial" actions may result in their withdrawal from the gambit of immu-
nity.
This argument is also flawed, as the majority points out, since
distinctions have already been made between private and public acts,
whereby once "official acts" of torturing for pleasure or the killing of
the gardener while in a rage by a head of state are already viewed as
falling in the private realm.174 Thus, as the line has already been
drawn and is in need of both clarification and a mechanism to monitor
its sliding scale, the appropriate vehicle can only be the rules and
principles of international jurisprudence. In the alternative, the dis-
senters attempt to make an end run on this argument by insisting that
if the words "public acts" or "official acts" are replaced by "govern-
mental acts," the distinction between private and public acts becomes
clear. 175 In attempting to solidify its "governmental" distinction, the
dissenters point to the fact that since Pinochet used both resources and
'7 See iL at 941.
171 Id. at 940.
f72 See id. at 927.
'3 See id. at 945.
174 See id.
'75 See id. at 928.
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agents of the government to carry out his crimes, and has no blood on
his own hands, the mere ordering of the crimes must be considered
governmental in nature. 176 This argument has two flaws. First, this
mere play on words fails to explain or legitimize the necessity of car-
rying out a systematic and widespread government-sponsored mur-
dering spree in supposed secret. Second, creating a loophole for
heads of state merely because they do not themselves have blood on
their hands runs contrary to the established laws of conspiracy and
accomplicity, 177 as well as the principles of liability agreed to'in
Rome (International Criminal Court) this past July, the most recent
expression of worldwide condemnation of such acts. 178 Thus, in light
of this attempted end run, it is time to supplement those statutes that
draw distinctions between public and private acts 179 with a provision
reflecting the necessity of assessing this characterization in light of
the growing body of internationally-proscribed crimes.
The fallout of the majority's finding that such crimes do not
qualify as official acts would also simultaneously undermine the dis-
senters' Act of State doctrine argument, one which would certainly be
thrust to the forefront as the new reason for Pinochet's immunity. As
previously mentioned, the basic premise of this doctrine is that one
State's judges will not "sit in judgment" on the official actions of an-
other sovereign committed in its own territory. 180 Thus, since the acts
of terrorism and torture cannot now be considered public or official
acts, the doctrine cannot apply. This theory is buttressed by U.S. v.
Noriega,181 wherein the court held that "[iun order for the act of state
doctrine to apply, the defendant must establish that his activities are
'acts of state,' i.e., that they were taken on behalf of the state and not,
as private acts on behalf of the actor himself."182 Notwithstanding
this argument, however, the majority correctly points out that such a
doctrine might not be applicable in the case of such a gross humani-
tarian violation. 183 Finally, the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign
176 See id.
177 See id.
179 See infra Part IV.A-B.
'79 See State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33 (Eng.); Diplomatic Privileges Act, 1964, ch. 81,
sched. 1, art. 39 (Eng.) (incorporating the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations).
'80 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (elaborating on the application of the
Act of State doctrine).
"' 746 F. Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fla. 1990), aft'd, 117 F.3d 1206(llth Cir. 1997).
182 Id. at 1521-22 (finding that a former leader can only be liable for private but not public
acts); see also W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400,409-10
(1990) (limiting the court's application of the doctrine to cases where a decision is to be had on
the lawful and sovereign acts of foreign states); Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 557-58
(5th Cir. 1962) (finding that financial crimes were committed for a personal gain and thus did
not qualify as official actions).
'83 See Exparte Pinochet , 4 All E.R. 897,946-47 (H.L. 1998).
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Relations Law of the U.S. appears to recognize the emerging relation-
ship between the principle of universality and the Act of State doc-
trine through its statement that a claim of torture or genocide
"would... probably not be defeated by the act of state doctrine, since
the accepted international law of human rights is well established."'18"
2. Jus Cogens
The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
U.S., in addition to dispatching the Act of State doctrine, encapsulates
the second issue involved in Pinochet case: whether, in committing
acts of terrorism and torture, the former head of state violated jus co-
gens norms of international law. This type of norm was defined in
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as a ""peremptory
norm' of international law ... accepted and recognized by the inter-
national community of states as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted."' 185 As such, norms attaining jus cogens
status appear to have been placed on a springboard toward universal
jurisdiction. In ascertaining whether such a norm has been violated,
judges must look to the subjects of international tribunals and their
respective national statutory implementations, common law doctrines,
and the works of respected theorists and jurists. Lawyers arguing for
the extradition of Pinochet insist that such norms have been broken,
and that a finding of immunity for Pinochet must be viewed as hypoc-
risy since one can not "condemn conduct as a breach of international
law and at the same time grant immunity." 186 In short, they argue that
a violation of ajus cogens norm must necessarily trump immunity.
Having determined that Pinochet is not entitled to immunity in
Britain as the former head of Chile, and is thus extraditable, the ma-
jority chooses not to address this issue. The dissenters, however, at-
tempt to discount both the significance of the growing list of interna-
tionally condemned crimes as they relate to sovereign immunity and
the implementation of punishment for jus cogens violations in na-
tional legislation. 187 While accepting that there has been a general
international movement toward placing some crimes outside the
scope of immunity for heads of state or other diplomatic officials,
Lord Slynn expresses his belief that such instances represent only
"aspirations" in their "embryonic" form.18' Notwithstanding the im-
"4 1& at 947 (quoting RESTATEMNT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 443(c) (1986)).
185 Hilao v. Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1471 n.6 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
M 6 Exparte Pinochet , 4 All E.R. at 928.
'87 See id. at 913.
183 Id.
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plementation of the concept of universal jurisdiction with respect to
the crimes of torture and terrorism, Slynn turns a blind eye to such
action by finding that it has not "been shown that there is any state
practice or general consensus let alone a widely supported convention
that all crimes against international law should be justiciable in na-
tional courts on the basis of the universality of jurisdiction."'89 Such
an assertion is irrelevant for the present purposes, however, since the
well-documented condemnation of terrorism and torture on both a
national and international level has resulted in a widespread imple-
mentation of universal jurisdiction over these crimes in various na-
tional courts. 190 While it is true that states have not provided for the
assertion of universal jurisdiction for all breaches of international law,
such a grandiose argument has no bearing in such a pointed matter.
Furthermore, such an assertion fails to recognize the ever expanding
list of condemned crimes begun at Nuremberg, over which universal
jurisdiction has been granted, and falls to appreciate the efforts to
bring notorious violators of human rights to justice over the last fifty
years.
Turning first to the relevant international conventions and Brit-
ain's respective implementation, the dissenters argue that the only
means by which heads of states' immunity is trumped by a violation
of a jus cogens norm is if the relevant statutory language specifically
refuses to extend them immunity much in the same manner that Nur-
emberg (article 7), the Genocide Convention (article 4), the tribunals
for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and the International Crimi-
nal Court statute (article 25) all did.191 After reviewing section 134(1)
of the Criminal Justice Act (1988)192 and the Taking of Hostages Act
(1982), 193 they found that neither specifically mentions heads of state
or former leaders, nor do they refuse to extend immunity to people in
such capacity; thus the jus cogens norms cannot be allowed to trump
Pinochet's immunity. 194 Specifically, section 134(1) of the Criminal
Justice Act reads: "A public official or person acting in an official
capacity, whatever his nationality, commits the offence of torture if in
the United Kingdom or elsewhere he intentionally inflicts severe pain
or suffering on another in the performance or purported performance
189 Id.
190 See, for example, the conventions, treaties, and statutes discussed at supra notes 51, 58,
62, 66, 68, 70, and 77.
'9' See Exparte Pinochet 1,4 All E.R. at 917.
192 Criminal Justice Act, 1988, ch. 33 (Eng.).
193 Taking of Hostages Act, 1982, ch. 28 (Eng.).
194 See Exparte Pinochet , 4 All E.R. 897 at 917 (reminding readers that Britain's Geno-
cide Act (1969) failed to incorporate Article IV of the Genocide Convention (1948) which spe-
cifically refused to extend immunity to heads of state for the commission of genocide; ergo,
Pinochet could not be tried for this crime in Britain).
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of his official duties." 195 In interpreting the language of this statute,
the dissenting Lords felt that its drafters did not intend to bring heads
of state within the gambit of the phrases "public official" or "person
acting in that capacity."' 96 Additionally, language in the Torture
Convention mandating that "[a] person, whatever his nationality,
who, in the United Kingdom or elsewhere ... commits an offence,"
was similarly dismissed as failing to extend liability to heads of
state.197
The dissenting judges' stance on the Criminal Justice Act's true
meaning lacks credibility in light of their aforementioned attempts to
discern the meaning of phrases such as "public official" and "acting
in official capacity" with respect to conferring immunity to Pinochet.
While from the outset it is difficult to believe that a head of state
would not fit within these categories, this point is hangnered home
when one applies the dissenters' own logic to these statutes. This
entails replacing these phrases with the word "governmental." How-
ever, the result of the addition of this word to the statute further sug-
gests that heads of state are covered by the statute, as it would be in-
conceivable not to consider a head of state as a "government official"
or one who acts in "governmental capacity." A seemingly stronger
argument as it pertained to immunity, the dissenters' own logic thus
works against them with respect to jus cogens norms and statutory
application.
In no single source of international jurisprudence is it mandated
that statutes or conventions must specifically reference heads of state
with respect to conferring or denying them immunity for their actions.
This fact, combined with the fact that replacing statutory language
with different wording often conveys an interpretation contrary to the
intention of the drafters, suggests that the two positions may be rec-
onciled without exchanging language. The reconciliation involves
interpreting the phrase "acting in official capacity" synonymously
with "acting under color of law," a phrase drawn from section 1983
of the U.S. Code. 198 In this vein, "public officials" would encompass
all public or government officials short of a head of state, yet "acting
in official capacity," under its new interpretation, would serve as a
catch-all phrase assigning liability to all persons, including heads of
state. Thus, since the dissenters argue that Pinochet used the power
19- Criminal Justice Act, 1988, ch. 33, § 134(1) (Eng.).
196 Exparte Pinochet I,4 All E.R. 897 at 916.
197 Taking of Hostages Act, 1982, ch. 28, § 1(1) (Eng.); see also Exparte Pinochet I, 4 All
E.R. at 917.
"' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. 111 1997).
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and resources of the state to carry out his actions, 199 it cannot be con-
tradicted that he acted in official capacity under the color of Chilean
State law and governmental authority. As such, his actions, clearly in
breach of internationaljus cogens norms, are entitled to no immunity,
and he may be prosecuted or extradited under the 1988 Criminal Jus-
tice Act.
Although the dissenters cursorily dismissed the language con-
tained in the 1984 Torture Convention2°° since it failed to explicitly
impose liability on former heads of state, their haste resulted in a fail-
ure to fully appreciate the applicability of articles 2(2) and (3 )201 In
short, the first section states that "[n]o exceptional circumstances
whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political
instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justi-
fication of tgrture."202 The significance of this provision can only be
understood when one asks the question: "Who would attempt to jus-
tify their actions using this example?" The answer can only be heads
of state, since they are the ones that have the most to lose should war
or political instability break out in their countries. This provision
serves to pre-empt the "public function" basis for claiming immunity
by stating that no form of public emergency can justify an act of tor-
ture. In Pinochet's case, the coup d'6tat and years of martial law that
ensued certainly can be described as a time of public emergency, thus
rendering his actions punishable under the act. The second provision
asserts that "[a]n order from a superior officer or a public authority
may not be invoked as a justification of torture.20 3 In light of the
conventions in existence at the time of this provision's drafting that
extend liability to those who gave the orders to commit humanitarian
crimes, it is inconceivable that this Convention's drafters sought only
to provide liability for the "little fish" while the "big fish" escape re-
percussion. Such a phenomenon would again fly in the face of the
principles of accomplicity and conspiracy.
Finally, an ironic twist, peculiar to the Pinochet case, is worth
mentioning. The former head of state stepped down in 1990 only af-
ter negotiating a new constitution granting him Senator-for-Life
status.2°4 As a Senator, surely Pinochet now qualifies as a public offi-
199 See Exparte Pinochet L, 4 All E.R. at 927.
200 The Criminal Justice Act of 1988 was implemented pursuant to Britain's obligations
following its becoming a signatory to the Torture Convention of 1984.
201 See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Annex, Part I, art. 2, §§ 2(2)-(3), U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1984f72 (1984) [hereinafter Torture Convention].
202 Id. § 2(2).
203 Id. § 2(3).
204 See Derechos Report, supra note 24.
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cial within meaning of the 1988 Act. Although Lord Slynn noted in
his opinion that "[a] head of state on ceasing to be a head of state is
not converted into a public official," that very anomaly exists in the
this situation.2 5 While it is unlikely that this will have bearing on the
proceedings since this status is only recently attained and none of the
actions for which he is charged pertains to post-1990, it is indicative
of possible loopholes that may have yet to be contemplated.
Ascertaining the drafters' true intentions in the Taking of Hos-
tages Act initially seems more difficult. While the most obvious ar-
gument would proffer that the phrase "a person" was inserted to cover
all persons regardless of their hierarchical position, without founda-
tion this assertion would lack the very credence from which the dis-
senters' bald statement suffers. However, the necessary foundation
can be provided by merely turning to the International Convention
Against the Taking of Hostages, from which this act is derived.2°
Under this convention, article 1, section (2)(b) establishes liability for
any person who "participates as an accomplice of anyone who com-
mits. . . an act of hostage-taking., 20 7 Thus, as the arrest warrant ac-
cuses Pinochet of organizing, funding, and ordering the acts of hos-
tage taking, he can be viewed as nothing less than an accomplice, and
definitely a co-conspirator, to the crimes committed. As such, his
status as head of state should not exempt him from liability, as this
would make a mockery out of well-established principles of criminal
law.
Turning to the common law for additional support, the dissenters
argue that Pinochet's detractors have been unable to cite a single case
"in which official acts committed by a head of state have been made
the subject of suit or prosecution after he has left office." 208 Instead,
the dissenters point to two cases, Al Adsani v. Kuwai?0 9 and Siderman
de Blake v. Argentina,2t in which heads of state were exonerated
from liability for acts that violated jus cogens norms. In Al Adsani, a
case involving alleged torture of the plaintiff by the Kuwait govern-
ment, the court rejected an argument that states were not entitled to
immunity with respect to acts that violated customary international
law.21' Similarly, the Siderman court, in an action alleging that the
Argentinean government committed acts of torture against the plain-
205 Exparte Pinochet ,4 All E.R. 897,917 (H.L. 1998).
206 See International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, adopted Dec. 17, 1979,
18 LLM. 1456.
207 Id. at art. 1, § (2)(b).
203 See E parte Pinochet , 4 All E.R. at 927.
209 107 I.L.R. 536 (Eng. C.A. 1996).
2o 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992).
21 See 107 .L.R. at 541.
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tiff, found that "although prohibition against torture has attained the
status of jus cogens in international law it did not deprive the defen-
dant state of immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
1976. "212 However, these cases are clearly distinguishable from the
Pinochet case since they were brought against the state as an entity in
an attempt to collect civil damages for the acts.
In fact, the case most relevant to Pinochet, as the dissenters ac-
knowledged, is Hilao v. Marcos,213 wherein the former head of state
was accused of committing numerous acts of torture while in office.
Although a civil case, the Marcos court found that the acts of torture
violated jus cogens norms, thereby removing them from the list of
immune official or public acts and rendering Marcos liable.214 The
dissenters found this case distinguishable, not because of its civil na-
ture, but on the grounds that the Philippines essentially waived all
forms of immunity pertaining to the ex-leader. 215 However, in light of
the Pinochet majority's finding that similar acts cannot be considered
official or public acts in a criminal case, the implication is that a
waiver of immunity is either not needed or is provided for by be-
coming a signatory to the international conventions establishing such
jus cogens norms. Thus, while Chile has clearly not waived Pino-
chet's supposed immunity for such crimes, this assertion may be ir-
relevant due to its status, and more importantly, Britain's status as a
signatory to the relevant conventions.
After reviewing both dissenters' opinions and the relevant statu-
tory and case law, the logic supporting the denial of Pinochet's im-
munity rests on solid ground. While the dissenting Lords' attempts to
validate their reasoning at first appears credible, their own rationale
eventually undermines their later stance. Despite their firm belief that
Pinochet is entitled to immunity regardless of jus cogens violations,
their arguments also smack of insecurity and hint at the inevitability
that former heads of state must be found liable for such gross hu-
manitarian violations. Nowhere is this better evidenced by than their
inclusion of the statement: "[W]hile there is some support for the
view that generally applicable rules of state immunity should be dis-
placed in cases concerning infringements of jus cogens, e[.]g[.,] cases
of torture, this does not yet constitute a rule of public international
law., 216 Not only is this quote indicative of the shaky foundation
212 Exparte Pinochet , 4 All E.R. at 929 (citing Siderman, 965 F.2d at 718).
213 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994).
214 See id. at 1472.
215 See Exparte Pinochet , 4 All E.R. at 927.
216 Id. at 930 (quoting Professor David Lloyd Jones, who testified before the panel of
Lords).
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upon which the dissenters' opinion lies, it highlights the emerging
norm that the world will no longer tolerate the impunity that has al-
lowed former heads of state guilty of crimes against humanity to trav-
erse the world free from justice.217
D. New Panel of Lords Reaches Similar Conclusion: Ex parte
Pinochet II
On March 24, 1999, a panel of seven Lords, selected to rehear
the Pinochet case following the questions surrounding Lord
Hoffman's lack of impartiality, handed down a decision that closely
mirrored its predecessors' recently vacated one. However, in ruling
that head-of-state immunity did not exonerate Pinochet from prose-
cution for certain crimes against humanity and acts of torture, and that
he thus could be extradited to Spain, the Lords significantly limited
the crimes for which the General could be prosecuted and, extradited
under Britain's laws.218 Despite this limitation, the Lords used nearly
identical logic and bodies of law to reach their respective decisions
and collective holding. Several points, including some holdover is-
sues, merit discussion.
During the interim between the two panels' findings, the land-
scape changed considerably. Most importantly, Chile sought to be
joined as a party in the matter, a move solidifying the notion that the
desired immunity was that of the Republic of Chile and not of the
General himself.219 Additionally, the gambit of charges levied against
Pinochet expanded yet again as more documented instances of torture
and conspiracy to commit torture came to light.220 After assessing
these nuances, six of the seven Lords ruling on the Pinochet matter
agreed that torture is an international crime over which numerous
bodies of international law, in particular, the United Nations Conven-
tion Against Torture, recognize universal jurisdiction of all courts,
regardless of the crime's locus.221 Five of these Lords, however, held
that Pinochet could only be prosecuted and subsequently extradited
for a limited number of the charges levied against him since the ma-
217 At the time of this writing, this House of Lords decision had recently been vacated as a
result of the failure of Lord Hoffman, who wrote for the majority, to disclose his personal ties to
Amnesty International, a human rights group that was allowed to argue before the court. While
the court's rationale still stands to reason, an entirely new panel of seven Lords reheard the
appeal and rendered a new verdict. The vacating of the House of Lords decision was the first of
its kind in the history of the House. See The Law Lords and the General, ECONOMIsT, Dec. 19,
1998, at 18.
218 See Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte, 2 All
E.R. 97 (H.L. 1999) [hereinafter Exparte Pinochet U1].
219 See Ud at 103.
220 See id.
22! See id. at 109, 141, 163, 168, 178, 190.
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jority of his alleged actions did not constitute extradition crimes under
U.K. law.
222
Two issues predominated throughout each Lord's finding and
accompanying rationale: (1) whether any of the charges levied against
General Pinochet constituted extradition crimes; and (2) whether, as a
former head of state, Pinochet enjoyed immunity ratione materiae for
the alleged organization of state-sponsored terrorism.223 In addressing
this first issue, the majority first looked to the dates on which the
U.K. ratified the Torture Convention. In short, it found that section
134 of the Criminal Justice Act of 1988 gave effect to the Torture
Convention on September 29, 1988, while the actual Convention was
ratified by the U.K. on December 8, 1988. Consequently, any acts of
torture committed outside the U.K. before September 29, 1988, did
not constitute a crime under U.K. law and thus could not be deemed
extraditable crimes.2 4 Furthermore, had Pinochet been entitled to
immunity ratione materiae as a result of his former head of state
status, the U.K.'s December 8, 1988 ratification of the Torture Con-
vention rendered him unable to claim this form of immunity in cases
of alleged official torture.225 Thus, of the thirty plus charges levied
against Pinochet, only three involved conduct alleged to have oc-
curred over a time span post-September 29, 1988.226 In fact, only
Charge 30, an allegation of torture, related exclusively to this pe-
riod.22 7 However, the Lords felt that conduct alleged in the other two
charges, when viewed collectively, showed that Pinochet engaged in a
policy of systematic torture during this period.228
After verifying the existence of extraditable crimes, the Lords
addressed the issue of whether Pinochet could claim immunity rati-
one materiae in relation to acts committed as part of his official func-
tions as head of state. The majority started with the premise that im-
munity ratione materiae protects all acts that a head of state performs
as part of his official functions.22 9 The underlying assumption is that
it is "[t]he purpose for which they were performed protects these acts
22 See id. at 115, 153, 168, 180. The five Lords were Lords Browne-Wilkinson, Hope,
Hutton, Saville and Phillips. Lord Millet, on the other hand, insisted that Pinochet could be
extradited for the entire gambit of charges levied against him. See id at 180.
m" See generally id.
224 See id. at 98.
225 See id. at 115.
226 Lord Browne-Wilinson stated that "only those parts of the conspiracy to torture al-
leged in charge 2 and of torture and conspiracy to torture alleged in charge 4 which relate to the
period after that date and the single act of torture alleged in charge 30 are extradition crimes
relating to torture." Id. at 107. The murder and hostage-taking charges, however, did not qual-
ify as such. See id
227 See id. at 98.
2V See id. at 115.
221 See id. at Illl.
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from any further analysis." 30 However, two exceptions to this blan-
ket-type immunity exist for: (1) criminal acts that a head of state, un-
der color of authority, engages in for sheer pleasure or personal grati-
fication; and (2) "acts the prohibition of which has acquired the status
under international law of jus cogens."' 31 The theory governing jus
cogens "compels all states to refrain from such conduct under any
circumstances and imposes an obligation erga omnies to punish such
conduct. ''232 The crucial question, as it was amongst the original
panel of Lords, was whether, with regard to particular crimes achiev-
ing jus cogens status, there is a general consensus that these crimes
"are outside the immunity to which former heads of state are entitled
from the jurisdiction of foreign national courts.2 33
Although the majority concluded both that the act of torture had
achieved jus cogens status and that Pinochet did not enjoy immunity
ratione materiae with respect to his actions of torture, their respective
rationales differed slightly. Lord Browne-Wilkinson addressed the
issue by questioning whether a jus cogens crime can be deemed an
official function of a head of state on behalf of a state ? 4 Drawing on
the essential elements of the international definition of the crime of
torture as set forth in the Torture Convention, he stated:
[Torture] must be committed 'by or with the acquiescence of
a public official or other person acting in an official capac-
ity.' As a result all defendants in torture cases will be state
officials. Yet, if the former head of state has immunity, the
man most responsible will escape liability while his inferiors
... who carried out his orders will be liable. I find it impos-
sible to accept that this was the intention.
2 35
In addition, Lord Browne-Wilkinson concluded that if state-
sponsored torture were deemed an official function "giving rise to
immunity ratione materiae," then even a head of state's subordinates
may escape liability under the same premise.236 Consequently, Lord
Browne-Wilkinson stated:
It would follow that there can be no case outside Chile in
which a successful prosecution for torture can be brought
230 Id. at 147.
231 id.
232 m
233m
2 See id. at 108. Lord Browne-Wilkinson proceeded with the knowledge that the Repub-
lic of Chile had conceded that the international law prohibition of torture had achieved a jus
cogens status. See id.
23 Id. at 114.
Z6 Id.
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unless the state of Chile is prepared to waive its right to its
officials' immunity. Therefore the whole elaborate structure
of universal jurisdiction over torture committed by officials is
rendered abortive and one of the main objectives of the Tor-
ture Convention ... will have been frustrated. 37
As such, he found that continuing immunity ratione materiae for
former heads of state must be deemed inconsistent with the Torture
Convention.238 Noting that Chile had become a signatory to the Tor-
ture Convention on October 30, 1988, signifying its agreement to
prosecute violators, and that the U.K. followed suit on December 8,
1988, Lord Browne-Wilkinson set the latter as the date on which Pi-
nochet presumptively lost his immunity ratione materiae for these
crimes.
2 39
Lord Hope, on the other hand, placed his emphasis on whether
the crime of torture had achieved the jus cogens status by the Sep-
tember 29, 1988 date. Stating that for Pinochet to lose his immunity,
"it would have to be established that there was a settled practice for
crime of this nature to be so regarded by customary international law
at the time when they were committed," Lord Hope found that no
such settled practice existed at that point.24° However, he quickly
pointed out that "there are sufficient signs that the necessary devel-
opments in international law were in place by that date." 241 Relying
on the discussion of jus cogens in Siderman de Blake v. Republic of
Argentina,242 the Torture Convention,243 and numerous articles writ-
ten in 1988 and 1989, he found evidence that the prohibition of tor-
ture had achieved this status.244 Consequently, Pinochet lost his im-
munity ratione materiae on December 8, 1988, the date when the
U.K. ratified the Torture Convention.245 Lord Hope's position on the
issue, however, is best typified by his statement in reference to Sep-
tember 29, 1988, the date from which the crime of torture's status was
measured: "But we must be careful not to attach too much importance
to this point, as the opportunity for prosecuting such crimes seldom
presents itself."
246
237 Id. at 115.
238 See id.
239 See id.
240 Id. at 151.
24, Id. at 152.
242 26 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1992).
243 See supra note 201.
244 See Exparte Pinochet 1, 2 All E.R. 97, 152 (H.L 1999).
245 See id.
2 Id. at 151.
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Lord Hutton, in contrast, dealt primarily with the issue of whether
Spain could bring suit against Chile in the U.K. without Chile's con-
sent. Drawing upon the principle that a state is responsible for the
actions of its officials when they perform those actions under the
color of authority, Hutton stated that this principle covered even ac-
tions performed "in excess of their proper functions."247 The Lord
next dispatched with Pinochet's lawyers' argument that Part I of the
State Immunity Act of 1978248 afforded Chile immunity in the U.K.
Although conceding that Chile would be afforded immunity in a civil
proceeding for damages, Lord Hutton cited Part I, section 16(4) as
controlling.249 That section expressly states that the immunity af-
forded under the act does not extend apply to criminal proceedings. 50
Inherent in this conclusion was the rejection of AI-Adsani v. Govern-
ment of Kuwait,251 Jaffe v. Miller, 2 and Siderman de Blake v. Re-
public of Argentina2  as precedential authority.2 4 Finally, turning to
the actual provisions of the Torture Convention,2 s he stated:
247 Id. at 156.
248 ch. 33 (Eng.).
249 See Exparte Pinochet 11, 2 All E.R. at 156; State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, Part I, §
16(4) (Eng.).
250 See Exparte Pinochet IL 2 All E.R. at 156. Lord Phillips also relied upon similar logic
in his opinion. Citing Part Il of the 1978 Act, affording immunity to a former head of state "in
respect of the performance of his official functions," Phillips stated: "I do not believe that those
functions can, as a matter of statutory interpretation, extend to actions that are prohibited as
criminal under international law. In this way one can reconcile... the provisions of the 1978
Act with the requirements of public international law." I. at 192. Additionally, analogizing a
head of state's functions to those of a diplomat, he cited article 3 of the Vienna Convention as
instructive: "'protecting in the receiving state the interests of the sending state and of its nation-
als, within the limits permitted by international law."' Id. In short, this article strongly sug-
gested that Pinochet had overstepped his bounds in light of the prohibition of torture achieving a
jus cogens status. See iL
25' 107 LLR. 536 (Eng. C.A. 1996). In Al-Adsani, a plaintiff brought a tort claim against
the government of Kuwait alleging torture. The court upheld the government's immunity under
section I of the State Immunity Act of 1978. See generally id.
252 95 I.LR. 446 (Can., Ont. Ct. App. 1993). In Jaffe government officials, sued in tort for
conspiracy to kidnap, were granted immunity for these actions. See generally id.3 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992). In Siderman de Blake, the court remanded a family's tort
claim against military officials for torture for a determination of whether Argentina's involve-
ment of United States courts in its suit constituted an implied waiver that rendered it subject to
U.S. jurisdiction. In short, despite recognition of prohibition of torture asjus cogens, Congress'
passage of the FSIA without such a provision prevented thejus cogens crime from trumping the
statute. See id. at 719.
254 Pinochet/Chile's lawyers argued that these cases should govern the Lords' decision;
however, Lord Hutton concisely stated that Part I of the State Immunity Act 1978 did not apply
to criminal proceedings. See Exparte Pinochet 11, 2 All. E.R. 97, 158 (H.L 1999).
25s See Torture Convention, supra note 201, at arts. 2, 4, & 7. These articles provide, in
part:
Article 2
1. Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other
measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.
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I do not accept the argument advanced by counsel on behalf
of Senator Pinochet that the provisions of the convention
were designed to give one state jurisdiction to prosecute a
public official of another state in the event of that state de-
ciding to waive state immunity. I consider that the clear in-
tent of the provisions is that an official of one state who has
committed torture should be prosecuted if he is present in an-
other state.
256
Consequently, since Lord Hutton could not reconcile a former head of
state's commission of torture with an official function, he was not
entitled to immunity ratione materiae.
257
Finally, Lord Saville also drew upon the language of the Torture
Convention in reaching his conclusion, yet found that the act of tor-
ture did not need to be deemed as being outside the realm of official
functions to trigger liability. Stating that an act of torture is "'in-
flicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence
of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity,"' he
concluded that the Convention contemplated coverage for heads of
state as "official torturers." 258 Consequently, immunity ratione mate-
riae, with respect to torture, could not coexist with the Torture Con-
vention since signatories could not "simultaneously claim an immu-
nity ... based on the official nature of the alleged torture."' 59 Thus,
Lord Saville agreed with his brethren that General Pinochet lost his
immunity ratione materiae on December 8, 1988 with respect to al-
leged official torture.260
2. No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war,
internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a jus-
tification of torture.
Article 4
1. Each State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its criminal
law. The same shall apply to an attempt to commit torture and to an act by any per-
son which constitutes complicity or participation in torture.
2. Each State Party shall make these offences punishable by appropriate penalties
which take into account their grave nature.
Article 7
1. The State Party in the territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged to have
committed any offence referred to in article 4 is found shall in the cases contem-
plated in article 5, if it does not extradite him, submit the case to its competent
authorities for the purpose of prosecution.
Id.
256 Exparte Pinochet 11 2 All E.R. 97, 165 (H.L 1999).
2 See id at 167.
258 Id. (quoting Torture Convention, supra note 201, at art. 1, § 1).
259 Id.
2'o See id.
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On April 15, 1999, the UK Home Secretary, Jack Straw, issued a
decision to order the application for Pinochet's extradition to pro-
ceed.261 Pending the Magistrate's approval, the Home Secretary (Jack
Straw) will be delegated with the authority to finally surrender Pino-
chet to the Spanish authorities.262
IV. WHAT COULD HAvE BEEN: PINOCHET AND THE ICC
A discussion on bringing Pinochet and other like-minded former
heads of state to justice would not be complete without mention of the
International Criminal Court's jurisdiction over such individuals.
Adopted in July of this past year, by a vote of 120 to 7 with 21 ab-
stentions, the ICC's statute is currently open to ratification by the
world community and will become operative when sixty states have
become signatories.263 Unfortunately, Pinochet will not be subject to
the court's jurisdiction as it is non-retroactive in nature.264 However,
an examination of the court's structure and how it might have gar-
nered jurisdiction over the former Chilean Head of State serves as an
excellent indication of how future despots may be subject to the body.
Furthermore, the creation of the body is the latest example of the
emerging norm that former heads of state guilty of horrific human
rights abuses will no longer escape justice.
A. The Birth and Maturation of the ICC
In December of 1989, the United Nations General Assembly, in
response to a request by Trinidad and Tobago, instructed the Interna-
tional Law Commission to push forward in its work to create an In-
ternational Criminal Court with jurisdiction to cover such crimes as
261 See Amnesty News, U.K.-Pinochet: Justice Is Being Done (visited May 27, 1999)
<http://www.amnesty.org.uklnews/press/releases/27,_may_1999-O.shtnl>.
262 See generally id. (explaining that unless an appeal is allowed and is subsequently suc-
cessful, "the extradition case will proceed to a committal hearing in the Magistrate's Court").
Immediately prior to this Note's publication, on October 8, 1999, a British magistrate ruled that
Pinochet could be extradited to Spain to stand trial. The ruling, while not an extradition order,
stated that Britain could legally extradite the general pursuant to the Home Secretary's approval.
Under British law, the Home Secretary enjoys broad discretion in evaluating extradition cases
and may, after all legal appeals are exhausted, end the case on a variety of grounds including
politics or Pinochet's ailing health. Interestingly, the Home Secretary, Jack Straw, recently
declined to force an eighty-seven (87) year old British woman, accused of treason, to stand trial
on account of her age and ailing health. Consequently, Chilean and Spanish diplomats who do
not support the extradition have begun to appeal to both Straw's humanitarian and political
sensitivities. See T.R. Reid, Pinochet Extradition Approved; Former Chilean Leader May Be
Tried in Spain, British Judge Rules, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1999, at A15.
263 See Nuremberg to Rome, supra note 72.
2 See Rome Statute, supra note 77, at art. 11.
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drug trafficking.265 A draft statute for an international criminal court
was presented to the General Assembly in 1994.266 In July of 1998,
after nearly six years of preparatory meetings and negotiations, the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was adopted.267
Endorsed by 120 nations, the ICC is viewed as a means "to end im-
punity," promote universal justice, "help end conflicts," "remedy the
deficiencies of ad hoc tribunals," "take over when national criminal
justice institutions are unwilling or unable to act," and deter future
despots.268 U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan summed up the
world's commitment to the body:
In the prospect of an international criminal court lies the
promise of universal justice .... We ask you... to do [your
part] in our struggle to ensure that no ruler, no State, no junta
and no army anywhere can abuse human rights with impu-
nity. Only then will the innocents of distant wars and con-
flicts know that they, too, may sleep under the cover of jus-
tice; that they, too, have rights, and that those who violate
those rights will be punished.269
However, despite such a universal rejoicing at the adoption of the
ICC, the body encountered its first obstacle as the United States, the
world's policeman on human rights violations, joined the likes of
Libya, China, Iraq and Sudan in advocating against the creation of the
court.270 As one delegate to the Rome Conference commented: "You
cannot have a court of universal jurisdiction without the world's ma-
jor military power on board." 271
The United States' veto stems from its disapproval of the Court's
structure and the manner in which cases are referred to the prosecutor
charged with investigating the crimes. Although article 1 of the stat-
ute dictates that the ICC will only exercise its jurisdiction over those
individuals accused of the most serious of international crimes, and
will do so in accordance with the principle of complementarity with
respect to states' national court systems, the U.S. fears that its sover-
eignty will be frequently invaded by virtue of its status as the world's
peacekeeper.2  In short, the U.S. has assumed that its soldiers and
26-5 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court - Overview (visited Aug. 27,
1999) <http:llwww.un.orgllaw/icc/general/overview.htm>.
266 See id.
267 See id.
26 Id
269 id.
270 See Scharf Testimony, supra note 1, at 73.
271 Alessandra Stanley, U.S. Dissents, But Accord is Reached on War-Crime Court, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 18, 1998, at A3 (quoting Dutch delegate Gam Strijards).
272 See Rome Statute, supra note 77, at art. 1; see also Nuremburg to Rome, supra note 72.
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political leaders, who in their capacities as world peacekeeper often
engage in acts that may be construed as crimes under the ICC's juris-
diction, will be the target of vengeful prosecutions.273 As such, the
U.S. has argued that all members of the U.N. Security Council, of
which the U.S. has a permanent seat, ought to be given the right to
veto any such prosecution attempt by the ICC. 274 In order to under-
stand the U.S. position, and how the ICC's provisions are necessary
in order to gain jurisdiction over former despots such as Pinochet,
several of the ICC's provisions must be examined.
B. Understanding the ICC's Structure and Jurisdiction
As mentioned above, the ICC statute is based on the principle of
complementarity, meaning that crimes fall within its jurisdiction only
when there is no competent or credible national court that can or will
exercise jurisdiction.275 As such, it provides for automatic, yet not
total, universal jurisdiction over the atrocities of genocide, war
crimes, crimes against humanity,276 and crimes of aggression. Its pre-
amble states the desire to vanquish the impunity for the perpetrators
of such crimes that has existed for much of the last half-century. 77
At the heart of controversy surrounding the United States was article
13, the mechanism by which the ICC prosecutor is referred cases.
278
What emerged from the Rome Conference is a two-track approach in
which cases are triggered by either: (1) the Security Council or
(2) individual countries or the ICC prosecutor on his own proprio
motu after receiving credible information concerning grave violations
of international law.279 Already insulated from prosecutions under
the first track by virtue of its Security Council veto, the U.S. sought
assurances that no U.S. national would be tried under the second track
without U.S. approval on a case-by-case basis.280  However, acqui-
escing to the U.S. position would have effectively "gutted the treaty"
and given "de facto immunity to the most conspicuous" and notorious
273 See Scharf Testimony, supra note I, at 73.
274 See id; see also Nuremberg to Rome, supra note 72.
275 See Brown, supra note 72, at 386.
276 Crimes against humanity are defined as including such acts as the following when they
are carried out on a widespread or systematic basis: murder, torture, rape, persecution against
identifiable group on political, racial, national, ethnic, religious, or gender-based grounds,
forced disappearances, deportations, and enslavement. See Rome Statute, supra note 77, at art.
7.
2n See id. at preamble.
278 See id. at art. 13.
279 See id; Scharf Testimony, supra note 1, at 73; UN Diplomatic Conference Concludes
with Decision to Establish Permanent International Criminal Court, M2 Presswire, July 21,
1998, available in 1998 WL 14097075.
28 See Scharf Testimony, supra note 1, at 73.
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criminals, as the very heads of state that the ICC was designed to
punish would never have consented to the jurisdiction of the court.281
Furthermore, much of universal credibility of the ICC would be lost if
the second track of trigger mechanisms was abandoned and each
prosecution was thereby subject to the veto of the five members of the
Security Council.282
To alleviate U.S. apprehensions, the court's structure was bol-
stered by protective mechanisms mandating jurisdiction over only
serious crimes "that represent a 'policy"' as opposed to "random acts
of U.S. personnel" abroad, a major concern of the U.S. delegation.283
Additionally, a system of checks and balances was adopted whereby a
three-judge pre-trial chamber must review the prosecutor's decision
to initiate an investigation into alleged crimes,284 a provision designed
to flesh out the politically-motivated or vengeful prosecutions the
U.S. felt would be brought against its nationals or leaders. 285 Not-
withstanding these assurances, the failure to obtain an "ironclad" ex-
emption for its servicemen and political leaders signaled the U.S.
delegation's decision to vote against the ICC.2 86 As such, the U.S.
will not be afforded the opportunity to assist in the drafting of the re-
maining rules and procedures or to nominate a judge to sit on the tri-
bunal. 287 Additionally, while not bound to cooperate with the court,
U.S. nationals could still conceivably be arrested and extradited to the
court by a party-nation having in personam jurisdiction.288  Finally,
and most importantly, the U.S. withdrawal of support sends a mixed
message to despotic heads of state and future violators of crimes
against humanity.
28 9
Notwithstanding the fracas caused by the United States and the
mixed message it sends to former despots such as Pinochet, the bulk
281 See Nuremberg to Rome, supra note 72.
2 See a
m Scharf Testimony, supra note 1, at 73. This assurance would prevent prosecutions for
such acts as the downing of the Iranian passenger airliner by the U.S.S. Vincennes or the ATF
assault on the Branch Dividian compound in Waco, Texas where 23 British nationals, three
Canadians, two Australians, two New Zealanders, and two Filipinos were killed. See Paul Craig
Roberts, British Abandon Law for Thuggery, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1998, at A12.
28 See Rome Statute, supra note 77, at art. 15. Under article 15, the prosecutor must ini-
tially conclude that, in light of the proffered evidence, there is a reasonable basis to proceed
with the investigation. He then submits this proof to the Pre-Trial chamber for authorization to
proceed; that body only gives its approval if it likewise believes there is a reasonable basis to
commence the investigation. See id.
25 See Scharf Testimony, supra note 1, at 73. Furthermore, the Security Council is pro-
vided with the opportunity to take a collective, not individual, vote on whether to postpone or
table an investigation for up to twelve months at its discretion. See id.
216 See id. at 74.
287 See id.
28 See iad
29 See id.
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of the ICC statute represents the concerted effort to hold such leaders
responsible for their actions after they leave office. Jurisdiction is
governed by article 12, which states that any signatory thereby ac-
cepts the Court's jurisdiction on a continual, and not a case-by-case,
basis.290 In short, the ICC may exercise this jurisdiction "if one or
more of the following States are Parties to this Statute or have ac-
cepted the jurisdiction of the Court... (a) The State on the territory
of which the conduct in question occurred... (b) The State of which
the person accused of the crime is a national." 291 In keeping with its
stated goals in the preamble, article 27 prescribes jurisdiction over
"all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In
particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government...
shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility.
2 92
The Court's complementary jurisdiction is evidenced through ar-
ticle 17, which renders various cases inadmissible293 where:
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State
which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or
unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecu-
tion; (b) The case has been investigated by a State which has
jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute
the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the
unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute;
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct
which is the subject of the complaint .... 294
As indicators of a national court's inability to prosecute an individual,
the article cites such phenomena as the collapse of the entire judicial
system or an inability to collect evidence and testimony from relevant
parties.295 An unwillingness to prosecute the alleged offender shall be
determined if "[t]he proceedings were or are being undertaken or the
national decision was made for the purpose of shielding the person
concerned from criminal responsibility," if the proceedings are not
being conducted "independently or impartially ... [and are thereby]
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice,"
or there has been "an unjustified delay in the proceedings." 296 Fi-
m9: See Rome Statute, supra note 77, at art. 12.
2A id.
292 Id. at art. 27.
293 Article 20 of the Rome Statute also covers the inadmissibility of certain cases and man-
dates that an individual who has already been tried by another court for his alleged crime cannot
be tried by the ICC unless the previous trial was conducted "for the purpose of shielding the
person" from responsibility. Id. at art. 20.
294 Id. at art. 17.
n5 See id.
296 Id.
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nally, the court may not force a nation to extradite an alleged offender
if this action would contravene internationally recognized principles
of diplomatic immunity.
29 7
C. Pinochet and Beyond
Unfortunately, the recent adoption of the ICC and its inability to
extend liability retroactively means that Pinochet will escape the ju-
risdiction of the tribunal. However, by adopting the "what if' ap-
proach,298 this high profile case may serve as a model for punishing
former heads of state under the ICC. Symbolically, on September 11,
1998, the twenty-fifth anniversary of Pinochet's ascent to power, the
Chilean Foreign Minister, Jose Miguel Insulza, signed the Rome Stat-
ute, a gesture implying Chile's eventual acceptance of the court's ju-
risdiction pursuant to article 12.299 While the Chilean Senate has yet
to ratify the treaty, fearing that ratification will imply acquiescence to
the Spanish position, this occurrence would in theory pave the way
for the ICC's ability to assert jurisdiction.300 As Chile would there-
fore be a signatory to the Court, the ICC would be able to validly as-
sert jurisdiction over Pinochet since he is both a Chilean national and
the crimes he is accused of committing were carried out in Chile,
thereby meeting both prongs of article 12.
In order to then carry out an investigation pursuant to articles 13
and 15, the case would need to be referred to the ICC's prosecutor by
the collective Security Council, another state party to the treaty, or on
the prosecutor's own proprio motu. In light of the United States' in-
volvement in the carrying out of Pinochet's Operation Condor, its
desire to keep the related intelligence files secret, and its tight-lipped
approach to the current matter before the British High Court, it is
likely the U.S. would veto such a motion. Instead, a more plausible
occurrence would find Spain, a state-party to the ICC, referring the
matter to the ICC prosecutor and delivering the research that Judge
Garzon has accumulated for the ICC prosecutor's assessment. Since
the cases of torture, terrorism, and murder are well documented, there
would more than likely be a reasonable basis to proceed with the in-
•vestigation and both the Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial chamber would
likely authorize its commencement. Pinochet's status as a former
297 See id. at art. 98.
298 In applying the "what if' approach, the reader must assume either that the ICC was
already in existence at the time the crimes were committed or that Pinochet was alleged to have
committed crimes following the creation of the court.
m See Debate Over Pinochet's Arrest Rages On, Inter Press Service, Oct. 21, 1998, avail-
able in 1998 WL 19901101.
300 See id.
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head of state would cause none of the problems encountered by Brit-
ain as article 27 specifically extends liability to such officials for their
atrocities.
Chile, however, would likely argue that the case is inadmissible
under article 17 on the grounds that it had investigated and is con-
tinuing to investigate the crimes, and that the Amnesty Law of 1978
exonerates Pinochet from prosecution.30' Furthermore, Chile is likely
to point to the fourteen pending cases currently in the hands of prose-
cutors as evidence that it is genuinely dealing with the matter nation-
ally.302 However, it is the position of this note that in light of the pro-
visions contained in article 17, such amnesty laws run contrary to the
principles of international law and are inconsistent with an intent to
bring the people to justice for their alleged crimes.30 3 In short, the
existence and passage of similar laws must only be viewed as an un-
willingness to prosecute those accused of the most horrific of crimes.
Specifically, the expeditious and cursory closings of numerous cases
against Pinochet by the Chilean Supreme Court not only smack of a
lack impartiality, but also an unwillingness to expend the time and
resources to afford justice to the victims of Pinochet's crimes.304
Furthermore, the removing and relocating of Chilean human rights
lawyers following their successful prosecutions can only be viewed as
an attempt to unjustly delay and impede the forward movement of the
most justiciable claims.305 Finally, token cases that currently remain
open must not be mistaken for light at the end of the tunnel, but rather
as a shield against international responsibility. While it is too late to
avenge the deaths of Pinochet's many victims via the ICC, proponents
of the Court must join forces with such human rights groups as Am-
nesty International to champion the illegality of national amnesty
laws. A failure to do so will inevitably allow a future despot to make
an end run on justice.
V. CONCLUSION
"'[Flor blood pollutes the land, and no expiation can be made for
the blood that is shed in it, except by the blood of him who shed
it.' ' 3°6 Drawn from the ancient Hebrews, this message is indicative of
101 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
302 See Hoge, supra note 43, at A10.
303 This position appears to have been hinted at in Lord Lloyd's dissenting opinion when
he remarked: "It has not been argued that these amnesties are as such contrary to international
law by reason of the failure to prosecute the individual perpetrators." Ex parte Pinochet , 4 All
E.R. 897, 929 (H.L. 1998).
304 See Amnesty Int'l Report, supra note 31.
... See id.
306 Beres, supra note 19, at 670 (quoting Numbers 35:33).
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the emerging norm to extend former heads of state no quarter with
respect to their atrocious crimes committed while in office. For much
of the last half century, the earth has been continually stained with the
blood of civilians caught up in political struggles to gain power at any
cost. Yet, while Nuremberg sounded a call for the end of the impu-
nity which marked the first half century, the world community was
initially sluggish in its response, lurching from crisis to crisis in at-
tempt to ameliorate the victims with legislation and punishment de-
signed solely on a case-by-case basis. Despite this irregularity, inter-
national jurisprudence ranging from the Genocide Convention to the
recently passed International Criminal Court has begun to break the
molds of apathy and come to reflect the growing belief that the noto-
rious violators of human rights law-in most cases former heads of
state-must not be allowed to traverse the world eluding justice.
However, this emerging norm can only be maintained by a consistent
policy reflecting the world's desire to punish the wrongdoers, bring
justice to the victims and their families, deter future violators, and
spread a pedagogical message concerning the rules of moral conduct.
While both Spain's call for the extradition of Pinochet and the
House of Lords' second finding that Pinochet is entitled to no immu-
nity for certain crimes of torture and conspiracy to commit torture
have sounded the alarm for despots living abroad, the United States'
failure to ratify the ICC, endorse the rise of the applicability of uni-
versal jurisdiction, and support Spain in its recent endeavors has
muted the force of Spain's actions and sent a mixed message to the
very same despots. Unfortunately, these apathetic policy choices
stem not from a condemnation of these states' actions, but rather from
selfish concerns about potential political embarrassment or unsub-
stantiated and unrealistic fears over hypothetical repercussions that
might result from a U.S. acquiescence to the world community's
emerging position. Particularly, Washington is reluctant to support
Spain's call for extradition as this would necessarily result in the need
to turn over classified files to Spain which document the U.S.' com-
plicity in both bringing Pinochet to power via the overthrow of Salva-
dor Allende in 1973, and its continued funding of Operation Condor
despite its awareness of the atrocious human rights violations that
were occurring in Chile.
307
307 Despite these concerns, U.S. officials are slowly complying with the requests of Span-
ish Magistrate Baltasar Garzon to turn over such documents. One newly de-classified cable
clearly shows how Henry Kissinger continued to provide support to Pinochet's regime through
1976 despite the hundreds of civilians that remained jailed following the 1973 overthrow. See
Lucy Kosimar, Kissinger Covered Up Chile Torture, OBSERVER, Feb. 28, 1999, at 3.
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Additionally, lackluster U.S. support can be blamed on the at-
tenuated fears that some nations will attempt to use institutions such
as the ICC as forums in which to hold American policymakers like
Henry Kissinger or Madeleine Albright liable for their decisions
which resulted in accidental civilian losses. Yet these concerns must
only be viewed as exaggerations of the cons in light of both the nature
of such decisions and the difficulty in prosecuting these cases 08 In
short, most, if not all U.S. foreign policy decisions involving military
force are defensive or retaliatory in nature, triggered by an aggressive
or rogue state that has violated the human rights norms that the world
community embraces. Furthermore, such efforts are generally carried
out with the physical, or at least the political, support, of many of the
world's representative nations, thus effectively guaranteeing world
acquiescence in U.S. action. Thus, such haphazard attempts to inflict
a vendetta-driven type of justice upon U.S. policymakers will ulti-
mately be unsuccessful. Finally, "[t]his concern oversimplifies the
mechanisms of justice" by failing to take into account the difficulty in
prosecuting such cases to fruition.3° One needs to look no further
than the Pinochet case to view the complex and lengthy investigatory,
extradition, and prosecutorial requirements that must be met to bring
even the notorious malefactor to the brink of justice. With such dif-
ficulty pervading the establishment of both a legal and factual basis
for the criminal charges, cases such as these "will continue to be
rare.
310
Recently, the U.S. has further convoluted the situation by siding
with Turkey in its attempt to extradite Abdallah Ocalan, leader of the
Kurdish Workers Party, from Italy,311 and pledging support to the
Cambodian government in its attempts to bring Ta Mok, a former
leader of the Khmer Rouge regime, to justice.312 While in accordance
with Madeleine Albright's recent assertion that the United States must
"strive to ensure that sooner or later, one way or another, terrorists are
held accountable for their crimes," these positions stand in marked
-1" See Jerry Fowler, Pinochet Arrest Is a Step Toward World Justice, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 22,
1999, at A26.
309 id.
310 id
31 See Jim Lobe, Ocalan and Pinochet, A Tale of Two Terrorists, Inter Press Service, Nov.
22, 1998, available in 1998 WL 19901647 [hereinafterA Tale of Two Terrorists].
312 See Julie Schmit, Cambodia's Quest for Justice Leads to 'Butcher,' USA TODAY, Mar.
8, 1999, at 10A. Ta Mok continues to be one of the most feared and hated of the Khmer Rouge
leaders responsible for the deaths of nearly 1.7 million Cambodians during the 1975-79 reign of
the regime. He has been personally implicated in numerous executions during that period. U.S.
State Department spokesman James Rubin recently spoke out on Mok's arrest and inevitable
trial: "We are encouraged that we now have the opportunity to bring one of the most notorious
war criminals in recent past to justice, and we will now be focusing our efforts on working with
the Cambodian government to that end .... Id.
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contrast to the official U.S. position on Pinochet, a former head of
state implicated in both terrorist acts and human rights violations
against not only Chileans, but citizens from all over the world, in-
cluding the U.S.313
Will the world be a better place if the Pinochets of the past and
future are held accountable for their crimes and brutal regimes? The
answer is a resounding yes. Accountability must displace the impu-
nity that has marked the world's past efforts to bring such malefactors
of human rights to justice. For it is through accountability that the
pedagogical impact of retribution, redress, and deterrence can be im-
posed and subsequently realized.314 Accountability must also prevail
over the belief that pursuing justice hampers internal social recon-
ciliation, as such an argument fails to appreciate the gravity and mag-
nitude of the international shock waves that emanate from such a
widespread breach of human rights norms. Finally, accountability is
the only answer as it ensures that amidst the legal and political hur-
dles, the world never loses sight of the victims and survivors of vic-
tims who at long last receive some sense of justice, vindication, and,
hopefully, closure. Thus, although politics often dictate policy, and
the bonds of old alliances are difficult to overcome, the time has come
for individual States to follow Spain's lead and call vociferously for
an end to the impunity that has marked the world community's at-
tempts to bring the most notorious of human rights violators to jus-
tice.
JAMISON G. WHITEt
313 A Tale of Two Terrorists, supra note 303. To date, Pinochet has been charged with
criminal acts that occurred in Rome, Buenos Aires, and Washington D.C. While Attorney Gen-
eral Janet Reno has indicated that she is looking into the possibility of reopening the case in-
volving a 1976 D.C. car bombing of former Chilean foreign ambassador, see T.R. Reid, Britain
Judges the Judges in the Pinochet Case, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1999, at A32, and Pinochet
enemy Orlando Letelier and his American aide, Ronni Moffit, it is unlikely that the case will
proceed in light of the aforementioned U.S. fears over investigating Pinochet. See Jonathan S.
Landay, Why U.S. Is Quiet on Pinochet Case, CHRiSTiAN SCI. MoNITOR, Dec. 4, 1998, at 4.
314 See Fowler, supra note 308, at A26.
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